摘要：基于我国283个地级市商业银行分支机构数量，并与2006至2013年工业企业数据库相结合，探究城市层面的银行分支机构扩张如何影响企业的融资约束。实证发现，区域内银行分支机构扩张显著降低了当地工业企业的融资约束。异质性分析显示，相比国有企业和大企业，银行分支机构扩张对融资约束的影响在非国有企业和中小企业中更加显著；地方政府干预使得不同银行分支机构扩张所产生的融资约束缓解效应存在差异，相比地方性中小银行，全国性银行分支机构的扩张对融资约束的缓解作用更加显著。作用机制检验显示，缓解作用主要通过缩短银企距离和提高金融发展水平来实现。
关键词：银行分支机构扩张；融资约束；工业企业；异质性；政府干预
中国影子银行的形成与发展
一、中国影子银行的发展历程
中国影子银行并不是新生事物，部分业务有较长的发展历史。上世纪80年代，信托公司、保险公司等非银行金融机构开始设立。1997年10月，《证券投资基金管理暂行办法》出台，证券投资基金开始大规模增长。2002年起，商业银行陆续开展理财业务。在这一时期，各类机构主要还是围绕自身业务经营范围发展，产品之间的边界划分较为清晰，影子银行整体规模不大。
2008年以后，影子银行进入快速增长阶段。为应对国际金融危机的冲击，货币政策由趋紧转向适度宽松，并取消了对金融机构信贷规模的硬性约束。2009年全年新增人民币贷款9.6万亿元，M2和M1分别增长27.7%和32.4%，为90年代以来最高。但随着房地产价格快速上涨和地方政府融资平台风险积累，货币政策开始收紧，同时加强对金融机构信贷投放总量、节奏和结构的管理，贷款增速和投向均受到严格约束。在这一背景下，为规避宏观调控和监管，银行将资产大量移到表外。各类跨市场、跨行业的影子银行因而迅速增长。尤其是，银行理财与信托公司的“银信合作”业务急剧膨胀。银行利用理财资金购买信托公司的信托计划，信托计划再以信托贷款方式投向房地产行业和地方政府融资平台。仅2010年上半年，银信合作业务就由年初的1.4万亿元猛增至2.08万亿元。证券资管、基金及其子公司资管将非标债权纳入投资范围，银证合作、银基合作、银证基合作快速发展。委托贷款也异化为贷款出表的重要通道，相当一部分是“假委托”。这一时期影子银行业务大多是银行主导，信托、基金、证券、保险主要是通道方，资金大部分投向非标债权。
2013年，银行理财投资非标资产占全部理财的比例高达27.49%。监管部门发布《关于规范商业银行理财业务投资运作有关问题的通知》，对银行理财投资非标资产设置了比例限制。影子银行的重心开始转向表内同业业务，产生了同业三方回购、同业特定目的载体投资、信托受益权等新的合作方式。同业特定目的载体投资从2012年末的3.6万亿元，跃升至2016年末的23.05万亿元。买入返售资产一路攀升，2014年中期达到10.5万亿元的历史峰值。资金信托规模从2012年末的6.98万亿元，快速扩张至2016年末的17.46万亿元。另外，互联网金融产品和网络借贷P2P贷款等新型业务模式也异军突起。市场统计，我国第三方互联网支付市场规模从2013年度的16万亿元猛增至2017年度的143万亿元。余额宝于2013年6月上线，到2017年末净资产已高达1.58万亿元。
二、中国影子银行的主要特点
受金融体系结构、金融深化程度以及监管政策取向等因素影响，我国影子银行经历快速发展的同时，也呈现出一些与其他经济体不同的特点。
第一，以银行为核心，表现为“银行的影子”。这是由我国以银行为主导的间接融资体系所决定的。我国银行业资产一直占金融业总资产的90%左右。正是因为银行业资产规模庞大，影子银行资产端和负债端均与银行密切相关。从负债端看，银行是非银行金融机构和影子银行资金的主要提供方。例如，基金公司私募资管业务一半资金来源于银行，资金信托40%以上的资金完全依赖于银行。从资产端看，影子银行的客户绝大部分是银行的客户，实质为通道业务。可见，中国的影子银行具有“银行中心化特征”。发达经济体的影子银行以共同基金、货币市场基金等非银行金融机构为核心，资金较少直接来源于银行体系。例如，美国共同基金2019年底受托管理资产规模为17.7万亿美元，与联邦存款保险公司所有参保银行18.65万亿元总资产规模基本相当。
第二，以监管套利为主要目的，违法违规现象较为普遍。各类机构利用监管制度不完善和监管标准不统一游离于监管边缘，在所谓的“灰色地带”大肆从事监管套利活动。另外，还存在大量“无证驾驶”，形成了“全民办金融”的小环境。例如，互联网金融平台本应只承担信息中介和支付中介功能，但事实上却从事贷款等资金信用活动，并长期处于监管真空地带。
第三，存在刚性兑付或具有刚性兑付预期。多数产品承诺保本或保最低收益。有的还与投资人签订“抽屉协议”，承诺刚性兑付。有的在产品销售过程中隐藏风险，夸大收益，不及时充分披露信息，造成“买者自负”难以真正落实。
第四，收取通道费用的盈利模式较为普遍。发达经济体影子银行主要是交易型模式，借助回购、卖空、做市等工具赚取利差收益。我国影子银行产品大多是认购持有到期，流动性低，以量取胜，拼市场份额。赚取通道管理费是盈利的主要来源。
第五，以类贷款为主，信用风险突出。发达经济体影子银行投资范围广泛，以标准化资产为主，信用违约风险较低。资金大多通过互相拆借、回购等市场手段获取，面临集中大额赎回的流动性风险。我国影子银行绝大部分是银行贷款的替代，但客户评级标准显著低于贷款客户，无论是融资来源还是资金投向都承担直接的信用风险，且风险大于银行贷款。
三、中国影子银行的判别标准、范围和分类
确定我国影子银行标准，必须兼顾影子银行国际标准的共性特征和我国影子银行的特点。在金融稳定理事会确定的信用转换、期限转换和流动性转换等基本属性的基础上，重点关注各种产品的风险传导、隐匿方式以及诱发系统性金融风险的可能性，以此提出我国影子银行范围的判别标准，按照风险程度高低，区分广义和狭义影子银行，分别确定属于其范围的业务活动。
（一）界定标准
影子银行界定标准主要包括四项：
一是金融信用中介活动处于银行监管体系之外，信贷发放标准显著低于银行授信。主要包括各类不受商业银行审慎监管标准约束的类信贷业务，又可以进一步分为两类：一是完全游离于金融监管体系以外却从事信用中介的机构和业务；二是虽然在监管覆盖范围内，但通过非洁净转移等各种方式规避商业银行审慎监管标准。例如，有些信用中介虽接受金融监管，但资本和拨备计提明显不足；有些非银行信用中介发放信贷标准显著低于银行授信标准，借款人现金流覆盖和信用缓释不足；部分贷款流向房地产、产能过剩领域甚至“僵尸企业”等银行贷款的限制性行业。
二是业务结构复杂、层层嵌套和杠杆过高。发行分级分层产品，区分优先级、中间级和劣后级，有的涉及账户分拆、多层嵌套。由于结构设计十分复杂，导致底层资产不清，风险难以识别，真实风险水平被掩盖。基金、理财、信托等可以作为交易对手直接进入同业拆借和回购市场，有的大量使用衍生产品，质押回购方式加杠杆。部分金融机构、互联网平台和地方资产交易所还将本应面向合格投资者发行的资管产品进一步拆分、转让，销售给风险承受能力较弱的一般个人客户。
三是信息披露不完整，透明度低。产品存续期间完全未披露基础资产信息，或披露不充分，投资者和市场第三方机构无法准确掌握产品规模、收益变现、投资比例、基础资产、交易结构等主要信息，也无从判断风险趋势和高低变化。由于跨机构、跨市场、跨行业频繁，各类风险相互交织，产品最终持有人难以穿透识别整体风险水平和风险环节。
四是集中兑付压力大，金融体系关联性和风险传染性高。各种以集合投资为主要经营模式的产品具有明显的期限转换作用，是影子银行的重要特征。当投资产品出现风险征兆时，从众心理将诱发“破窗效应”，极易造成挤兑冲击。此外，部分集合投资产品还集中投资于金融机构发行的产品，遭遇集中兑付后，风险会在金融体系内传染、叠加和共振。
（二）影子银行的范围和分类
按照上述界定标准，我国影子银行可以分为广义和狭义两大类。其中，广义影子银行是基本符合四项界定标准的金融产品和活动，狭义影子银行则是其中影子银行特征更加显著、风险程度更为突出的产品和活动。
1.广义影子银行
主要包括：银行同业特定目的载体投资、委托贷款、资金信托、信托贷款、银行理财、非股票公募基金、证券业资管、保险资管、资产证券化、非股权私募基金、网络借贷P2P机构、融资租赁公司、小额贷款公司提供的贷款，商业保理公司保理、融资担保公司在保业务、非持牌机构发放的消费贷款、地方交易所提供的债权融资计划和结构化融资产品。由于没有非持牌机构发放的消费贷款、地方交易所提供的债权融资计划和结构化融资产品的统计数据，在计算中国影子银行规模时，暂不包括这几类产品。
同业特定目的载体投资。同业特定目的载体投资是表内业务，指银行购买他行理财产品、信托投资计划、证券投资基金、证券公司资产管理计划、基金管理公司及子公司资产管理计划、保险资产管理产品等特定目的载体（SPV）的投资行为。按照会计准则关于金融资产四分类标准，大多计为应收款项投资。这些业务透明底极低，表面看是购买各种资管产品，但基本上属“黑箱”操作，基础资产和交易结构十分复杂。经过穿透后大部分是类信贷资产，许多投向资金池产品。由于没有强制性的监管约束，银行将同业特定目的载体投资作为监管套利的重要方式。
委托贷款。传统的委托贷款属于银行表外业务，银行作为受托人，按照委托方确定的贷款对象和利率发放贷款，不承担信用风险，不需计提拨备和资本。但2008年之后，委托贷款异化为银行规避信贷标准的通道，业务完全由银行主导，委托方和贷款对象都由银行确定，银行出具隐性担保或抽屉协议，承担信用风险，实际上并不是真正的“委托”。2009年初，委托贷款规模不到3万亿元，2010—2015年连续6年增速超过30%，多家股份制银行2013年增速超过100%，2016年底规模猛增至13.97万亿元。
资金信托。资金信托是信托公司的主要业务，属于私募资产管理产品，按投资者人数分为单一资金信托和集合资金信托，其中近三分之二由银行等金融机构持有。由于信托具有“跨界”的独特优势，资金信托具有严重的交叉金融风险。另外，信托产品设计灵活，普遍具有多层嵌套结构，容易成为投资者加杠杆、以小搏大的工具，风险传染性强，且容易隐藏和放大。
银行理财。在理财业务发展初期，银行以发行保本保收益理财产品为主，产品透明度较低，信息披露不充分。特别是封闭式产品存续期间，投资者不清楚收益和风险情况，偏离了“受人之托，代客理财”的业务本源。理财资金来源以普通个人投资者为主，比例基本在60%以上，2018年曾达到86.9%，集中兑付风险较大。非金融企业和金融同业直接持有理财产品比例也不少，集合投资特征明显。理财资金投资范围广泛，包括债券、存款、货币市场工具、资管产品、委托投资和非标资产等。资管新规出台前，理财投资非标资产的平均剩余期限为784天，而非保本理财产品的平均剩余期限为129天，期限错配严重。
非股票公募基金。公募基金向多个投资者募集资金，根据事先确定的投资策略将集合资金进行投资运作，具有类存款的特征。为满足投资者的流动性需求，部分公募基金提供“T+0”赎回提现服务。由于存在严重期限错配，当市场出现压力和波动性加剧时，公募基金特别是开放式公募基金，很容易出现份额大量赎回甚至“挤兑”，因此，金融稳定理事会也将货币市场基金、混合基金、债券基金等全部纳入影子银行范畴。
证券业资管。包括证券公司、基金管理公司、期货公司以及这些公司的子公司所发行的资产管理产品。这类资管产品以通道业务居多，2018年基金子公司通道类业务规模占比高达75.2%，资金超过80%以上来源于银行。
保险资管。主要是债权投资计划、股权投资计划和组合类产品，通过非公开方式发行。截至2019年末，保险资管产品余额2.76万亿元。
资产证券化。主要包括信贷资产支持证券（信贷ABS），交易所资产支持专项计划（企业ABS）和资产支持票据（ABN）三类。资产证券化产品一般都设置优先与劣后的结构化方式，资金来源多为各类资管和理财产品，但是产品本身流动性严重不足。截至2019年末，市场存量为3.83万亿元。换手率不到30%，远低于中央结算公司托管债券200%以上的整体换手率。由于资产证券化信息披露不充分，基础资产良莠不齐，还有部分地方交易所发行大量类资产证券化产品，基础资产透明度更低，一旦基础资产劣变，极易产生集中兑付压力，风险隐患突出。
非股权私募基金。非股权私募基金是一种以非公开方式向合格投资者募集资金的投资基金。我国私募基金不设行政许可，只在证券投资基金业登记备案，由行业开展自律管理。近年来，私募基金重大风险个案时有发生，部分私募基金登记备案虚假不实、挪用侵占基金财产，与非法集资、P2P等相互关联，出现较大兑付风险。因不受直接监管，部分基金成为影子银行加杠杆的通道。
网络借贷P2P贷款。网络借贷机构是专门从事网络借贷信息中介业务活动的平台，按工商企业登记注册。借款人与出借人通过平台直接对接，完成借贷。2013年以来，部分网贷机构逐渐偏离信息中介、信贷撮合等服务定位，违规开展信贷和资金池运作，甚至呈现出庞氏骗局的典型特征。
融资租赁公司、小额贷款公司、典当行提供的融资，商业保理公司保理、融资担保公司在保业务。这类业务本质上是类融资或为融资活动提供担保，是典型的信用中介，但信贷标准显著低于银行贷款。例如，融资租赁业务中大部分为售后回租，其中部分售后回租业务租赁物虚化，名为融资租赁、实为变相发放贷款，其资金投向主要集中于政府基建项目、房地产等领域。
截至2019年底，中国广义影子银行规模为84.80万亿元，占2019年国内生产总值的86%，相当于同期银行业总资产的29%。
2. 狭义影子银行
在广义影子银行中，同业特定目的载体投资、同业理财和投向非标债权及资管的银行理财、委托贷款、信托贷款、网络借贷P2P贷款和非股权私募基金的影子银行特征更为明显，风险程度更突出，属于高风险的狭义影子银行范畴。截至2019年末，狭义影子银行规模为39.14万亿元，占广义影子银行的46.2%，较历史峰值下降11.87万亿元。
影子银行的起源与演变
一、影子银行的提出
影子银行这一概念是由美国经济学家保罗·麦卡利（Paul McCulley）于2007年首次提出。他认为美国当时存在大量承担信用中介的金融活动，虽然游离于常规金融体系以外，但实际功能与银行无异。由于“在阴影之下运行”（operate in shadow），故而成为金融体系中隐匿的系统性风险。麦卡利曾于1998年提出“明斯基时刻”（minsky moments），预警俄罗斯金融危机。如同明斯基时刻一样，影子银行最初被提出时，只是描述了金融体系中的一种现象，并未获得应有的重视。
2008年美国次贷危机爆发后，对危机诱因的反思使影子银行成为热点话题。国际货币基金组织在2008年10月发布的《全球金融稳定报告》中提出了“准银行”（near-bank）概念，指代那些通过发行资产支持证券、抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）、担保债务凭证（CDO）和资产支持商业票据（ABCP）调节常规银行信贷的特殊目的实体。同年，时任美国财政部长的盖特纳（Timothy Geithner）在一次演讲中表示，在常规银行体系以外存在着一个庞大的金融体系，并且主要投资于流动性差、风险高的资产，与常规银行体系构成了一个“平行银行体系”（parallel bank system）。
2010年10月，时任美联储主席的伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在金融危机调查委员会总结报告中提出，影子银行是一类游离于银行监管范围之外的金融机构，他们充当储蓄与投资之间的信用中介；证券化工具、资产支持票据、货币市场基金、投资银行、抵押公司以及其他诸多不同类型的机构，都具有影子银行特征。伯南克认为，很多影子银行业务已经存在了50多年，由于部分业务出现过度创新和快速扩张，才成为引爆危机的祸根。
原英国金融服务局主席特纳勋爵认为，影子银行的发展并未背离金融体系的发展规律。金融本质上是资金中介，银行贷款是最传统的中介模式，而创新型金融产品的发展速度惊人。1980年，银行按揭资产有80%留在表内；2008年，这一比例降至35%，其余部分大多通过证券化方式出表，而这正是以基金为主的影子银行的重要来源。2011年，金融稳定理事会提出，影子银行是“常规银行体系以外的信用中介机构和信用中介活动”，并初步估算，全球影子银行规模在2002—2007年间从27万亿美元扩张至60万亿美元。
可以看出，这一期间尽管没有给出影子银行的严谨定义，但已勾勒出其基本属性：影子银行是金融创新和发展的产物，在功能上承担金融中介特别是信用中介职能，在依托载体上以金融监管边界以外的非银行金融机构为主，在开展形式上高度依赖具有复合和结构化特点的创新金融工具。影子银行本身是常规银行体系的补充，但由于缺乏必要的监管，影子银行很容易成为系统性风险的重大隐患。
二、影子银行的主要特点
一是非银行金融机构是主要载体。这是影子银行最广泛的定义方式。只要常规银行以外的金融机构从事了相关业务，都可以被纳入影子银行范畴。金融稳定理事会在其对影子银行的定义中采用了“其他金融机构”（other financial institutions）的表述，从形式上对影子银行进行界定，优点是非常直观，缺点是过于宽泛，针对性不强，无法瞄准影子银行的问题根源。
二是功能上具有金融资产风险因素转换的作用。早期关注焦点主要在影子银行的金融中介职能类型，将是否具有信用中介职能作为区分影子银行的标准。较为典型的是国际货币基金组织提出的“非银行信用中介”（non-bank credit intermediation，NBCI）的概念。但影子银行普遍结构复杂，且资金募集模式颇为个性化，难以直观判定其是否具有信用中介作用。此后，国际货币基金组织和金融稳定理事会都提出，关注影子银行的目的在于揭示其产生风险的原因。金融资产的风险根源是信用与流动性状况劣变，而金融中介往往充当风险因素转换的角色，最终会成为风险承担人。因此，影子银行应当是具有信用、流动性和期限转换功能的主体，这也成为金融稳定理事会此后建立影子银行监测框架的基础。
三是构成系统性风险的重大隐患。一方面，影子银行具有常规银行信用中介职能，承担常规银行的各类风险。另一方面，由于影子银行主要向常规银行覆盖范围以外的实体提供融资，这些实体信用水平较差，违约概率和违约损失率相对较高，而且大部分业务跨市场、跨行业，透明度较低，容易成为系统性风险源头。例如，2008年的次贷产品就是由各类资产管理机构和基金发行，普遍采用资产打包分层的复杂结构，并采用信用违约互换等增信手段，导致风险隐藏、难于识别。正因为影子银行是系统性风险的重大隐患，第三版巴塞尔协议改革将其作为治理的重点对象。
四是游离于审慎监管、行为监管和救助体系之外。金融业具有高度负外部性，各国监管当局都已经建立了成熟的审慎监管和行为监管框架，并且都采用特许牌照的准入模式。金融体系普遍受到央行流动性支持、最后贷款人以及存款保险和投资人保护等制度的保障。影子银行通常不受任何监管或者只受到较低程度的监管，也没有被纳入外部救助保障体系，一旦出现重大风险，只能依靠自救。但由于普遍存在资本金和准备金储备的严重不足，其自救能力也仅是杯水车薪。
三、影子银行的构成及其演变
（一）影子银行定义的三种模式
各国监管当局对影子银行范围的界定各不相同，评级公司等市场机构也分别建立了自己的影子银行分析框架。目前，国际上主要有三种公认的定义模式，即资金来源模式、金融稳定理事会模式和非核心负债模式。
资金来源模式是以金融活动资金的来源为区分标准，将资金来自于非银行机构的活动均纳入影子银行范畴。这种方式的优点在于数据标准统一且数据历史较长，缺点是没有考虑业务活动的经济实质。金融稳定理事会模式则是确定宽、窄两种标准，宽口径范围与资金来源模式基本相同，而窄口径则主要基于经济功能判断，聚焦可能威胁金融稳定的信用中介。非核心负债模式是国际货币基金组织提出的，试图完全突破形式特征的局限，认为只要不同于常规银行存贷款业务模式的任何其他融资活动都可算作影子银行。如银行表内投资和表外财富管理都可纳入影子银行。这对我国以银行影子为中心的影子银行体系颇具借鉴意义。
（二）金融稳定理事会定义的影子银行
金融稳定理事会作为全球影子银行监测的组织者，其对影子银行的识别标准最具影响力。根据2010年二十国集团领导人首尔峰会要求，金融稳定理事会组建了专项工作组，并于2011年10月发布了《加强影子银行监测和监管的建议》，提出影子银行的定义、监测范围和计算标准，并采用“两步走方法”（two-step approach）：首先统计宽口径的影子银行，包括所有常规银行体系以外的信用中介活动；其次再通过聚焦风险特征，统计窄口径的影子银行，包括具有信用、流动性和期限转换功能和杠杆交易而可能引发系统性风险的活动。自2015年开始，金融稳定理事会进一步完善影子银行的定义和标准，引入了三层次和两步走相结合的方法。其中，第一层次为宽口径影子银行，包括所有非银行金融中介业务（monitoring universe of non-bank financial intermediation，MUNFI）。第二层次为其他金融中介（other financial intermediaries，OFIs），从宽口径中剔除保险公司、养老基金和金融辅助机构后得到。第三层次为窄口径的狭义影子银行（narrow measure），是影子银行监测的重点，按照风险特征界分。为进一步甄别影子银行的风险因子和趋势，2016年起，金融稳定理事会引入经济功能（economic functions，EFs）的概念，将窄口径影子银行细分为5类。
金融稳定理事会最新发布的年度报告显示，2018年底，全球金融总资产为378.9万亿美元，广义影子银行总量为183.7万亿美元，其中其他金融中介（OFIs）114.3万亿美元，狭义影子银行50.9万亿美元。目前，FSB已完成2019年数据的收集工作，正在进行统计分析，预计影子银行规模整体保持稳定。
（三）危机后影子银行发展变化趋势
自2012年以来，金融稳定理事会每年组织开展数据收集和分析，至今已连续发布8期监测报告，揭示了2008年金融危机后全球影子银行发展的趋势变化。一是影子银行增速放缓。危机后，影子银行增速放缓；狭义影子银行尤其明显，2012—2017年的年度平均增速为8.5%，2018年进一步降至1.7%。二是高风险业务比重下降。以危机中暴露风险最为突出的结构性产品为例，近年来，欧洲和美国结构性融资特别是住房抵押证券（RMBS）和资产支持票据（ABCP）显著压缩。2016年底，美国住房抵押证券从2007年2.5万亿美元的峰值下降至不到1万亿美元；资产支持票据也缩减了近50%。第一类经济功能（EF1）影子银行极易引起流动性挤兑，2018年后增速下滑明显。三是业务透明度增强。影子银行业务标准化成效显现，证券化产品结构简单，层层嵌套的产品向简单的标准化（vanilla）产品转变。危机后，美国有10万亿美元投资于复杂结构产品的基金转为标准化集合投资工具。第二类经济功能（EF2）中最不透明的“其他非银行信用中介”下降了近7万亿美元，交易方式也发生了很大的变化。危机前，几乎所有影子银行都以场外双边协议的形式交易，危机后场内集中清算和中央交易对手标准实施后，集合投资工具交易所集中交易（exchange-traded）数量增长了1倍。值得注意的是，危机后，新兴经济体影子银行增速开始高于发达经济体。2019年底，新兴经济体在全部影子银行规模中的占比已由危机前的4%上升至15%。
四、影子银行的功能和作用
影子银行业务由来已久，犹如硬币的两面，唯有辩证对待、因势利导、“抑恶扬善”，才能趋利避害，充分发挥影子银行的积极作用。
（一）影子银行是金融中介体系的有机组成部分
影子银行之所以在金融体系中具有一席之地，是两重因素结合的产物。一方面，银行体系无法彻底解决信息不对称。金融中介是撮合资金需求与供给的桥梁，解决信息不对称是传统银行最专长和熟悉的。但由于信息不对称广泛存在，银行不可能全部覆盖。随着金融市场的发展，银行也不可能包揽全部金融中介。欧美国家在20世纪末普遍建立了完善的全能型金融体系，在许多国家形成了间接融资与直接融资并驾齐驱的双融资市场格局。美国1999年出台《金融服务现代化法》，取消了1933年《格拉斯—斯蒂格尔法》对混业经营的限制；此后又出台《商品期货交易现代化法》，将场外交易置于监管体系之外。借助直接融资体系的便捷，影子银行业务快速增长。另一方面，影子银行满足了个性化的金融需求。部分金融消费者风险偏好较高，愿意承担较高的风险以换取较高的回报。而商业银行以传统的存贷款业务为主，审慎文化是立足的根本，远远无法满足这些多元化需求。
（二）影子银行是套利行为驱使的产物，具有天使与魔鬼的两重性
套利具有两面性，金融中介作为解决信息不对称的手段，其经营本质就是寻找市场的价格差异，亦即是一种套利（arbitrage）行为，本无可厚非。然而，影子银行在发展过程中追求短期收益和绝对利润，演变成“为套利而套利”。例如，危机前出现的各种层层嵌套、结构复杂的产品让人眼花缭乱。各种资产抵押证券、担保债务凭证（CDO）和信用类衍生品的基础资产普遍不符合银行授信的最低标准，但却呈几何级数野蛮生长，充斥了信贷、债券和股票市场，成为引爆系统性风险的“定时炸弹”。影子银行是金融工具，介于天使与魔鬼之间，管理好了是天使，管理不好是魔鬼。
CHAPTER 4
Good, bad, or indifferent, you’re always thinking, you’re
doing, you’re extending yourself. If you don’t do that, the
place becomes a bore. You’ve got to create some excitement.
—ROSS JOHNSON
On October 19, 1987, the stock market crashed. Like the rest of the financial world, Johnson tuned in his Quotron and slipped into a state of
shock. RJR Nabisco, which had been trading in the mid-sixties the week
before, plunged into the low forties by midday. In the crash’s wake, the
stock languished there for weeks.
It was the beginning of Johnson’s road to ruin, for the low stock price
would haunt him for months to come. In December the company posted
a 25 percent profit increase, and the Street ignored it. Even when food
stocks rose that winter, RJR Nabisco remained in the dumps. No matter
what Johnson did, buyers treated his stock like a tobacco stock, even
though 60 percent of its sales came from Nabisco and Del Monte.
In Atlanta, Johnson simmered. Like many chief executives, he considered his stock price something of a report card. As he watched other
food stocks soar, Johnson felt like a wallflower at the orgy. If the business he knew best was hot, Johnson was determined to be a player. He
began pondering the possibility of linking up with a food company.
His first thought was Pillsbury. It was an unstable situation, his favorite kind, with takeover speculation swirling around a chief executive just come out of retirement. Buying the company, though, ran against
Johnson’s grain. He was a seller, not a buyer. He considered a joint
venture. Why not combine Pillsbury and Nabisco, sell its stock to the
public, and thereby highlight the remaining food assets inside RJR
Nabisco?
Johnson tossed the idea to Sage and Benevento, who were hugely
unimpressed. Pillsbury was a dog, they said, its core businesses anemic.
“Why would you want to own part of a so-so food business rather than
one hundred percent of a great one?” asked Benevento. As Sage typed
what they called a “stick-it-in-your-ear” memo to Johnson, Benevento
looked over his shoulder. A thought struck him. General Motors, faced
with a similar problem, had created separate classes of stock for the
parent company and its Hughes Aircraft and Electronic Data Systems
units. If Johnson was worried that tobacco was dragging down the price
of his food stock, why not make them trade as separate securities? If
GM could have an H stock for Hughes, why couldn’t RJR have an F
stock for food? They tacked it on the end of the memo. When Johnson
saw it he shrugged, then gave Benevento the go-ahead to look at the
dual-stock plan. It was just another idea.
Johnson wasn’t the only one who noticed RJR Nabisco’s low stock
price. In January the syndicated columnist Dan Dorfman mentioned
the company as a takeover candidate. Johnson pooh-poohed the notion,
although some of his aides, including Ed Robinson, grew worried. Then,
as February’s board meeting broke up, Paul Sticht approached Johnson.
The two hadn’t talked much since Sticht’s ouster six months earlier.
“Ross, are you going to be down in Florida this weekend?” Sticht asked.
“Yeah,” Johnson replied, “I’ve got to go down and do my dad’s taxes.”
“Are you going to have any spare time?”
“Really, I’m not,” Johnson said, eager to avoid any invitation from
Sticht. “I’m up to my tail.”
“Well, there’s a very important shareholder, and you should get to
know him,” Sticht said. “He’s got some ideas, and he’s going to be down
in Lost Tree. His name is Spangler.” Johnson reluctantly agreed to meet
Sticht and his friend Spangler the following Saturday in Jupiter.
Clemmie Dixon Spangler, Jr., was the president of the University of
North Carolina. Before taking its helm in 1986, “Dickie” Spangler had
been a bona fide big wheel in North Carolina business circles: president
of C. D. Spangler Construction Co. of Charlotte, and chairman of the
Bank of North Carolina, which, when it was sold to giant NCNB Corp.
in 1982, made him a rich man. His family was also one of RJR Nabisco’s
largest shareholders.
Spangler had been incensed when Johnson pulled the headquarters
out of Winston-Salem. He had called an old Harvard Business School
classmate, Richard H. Jenrette, chairman of The Equitable Life Insurance
Society, one of the nation’s largest insurance companies. Dick Jenrette
was a native North Carolinian and knew the Spangler family well.
Spangler wanted to know if The Equitable, among the nation’s most
powerful institutional investors, would be interested in backing some
sort of shareholder vote in an attempt to reverse the move to Atlanta.
“You think we could get enough votes to stop that from happening?”
Spangler asked.
Frankly, Jenrette replied, “No.”
Jenrette put the call out of his mind. Then, several months later
Spangler called again. “Dick,” he said, “what would you think about
forming a group to do a leveraged buyout of Reynolds? I think it can
be done.” Spangler mentioned that he planned to approach Paul Sticht
and also hoped to interest Jim Robinson of American Express, with
whom he had prepped at Woodberry Forest in Virginia.
Jenrette mulled the offer for several days before deciding it would
appear unseemly for a major insurance company—one that doled out
millions each year to cancer victims—to invest in a cigarette maker.
“I’ve got to back off on it,” he told Spangler.
Spangler stewed as RJR Nabisco stock plummeted during the crash.
He blamed his losses—and North Carolina’s—squarely on Ross Johnson.
He approached Sticht through a mutual friend, John Medlin of
Wachovia. “If I could get the funds to take control of the company,
would you be interested in helping me put things back the way they
were?” Spangler asked.
Sticht played coy. “Gee,” he said, “I don’t think that’s possible or
practical.” But when Spangler invited him to an exploratory meeting
in New York, Sticht accepted. The meeting turned out to be with a group
of Citibank executives. Spangler had interested the mammoth bank in
financing an LBO of RJR Nabisco.
Sticht was impressed. He was also practical. LBOs weren’t a hostile
device. If Spangler’s group wanted to buy RJR Nabisco, they would
have to involve Johnson. “Can you arrange for me to meet with him?”
Spangler asked.
And so Johnson found himself on a Saturday morning in late February
unlocking the Team Nabisco office in Jupiter. Seeing Sticht was keeping
him from his golf game, and he hoped they could wrap it up quickly.
When he was introduced to Spangler, Johnson’s first thought was that
he and Sticht made a splendid pair. Dickie Spangler’s slicked-back hair
and clear-framed glasses were straight out of the fifties.
“I really don’t have anything to do with this,” Sticht began. “Dick
has come to me. He has some ideas. And I think he should talk to you.”
RJR Nabisco was a great company, Spangler began. It had great
prospects, though it remained undervalued.
Blinding glimpse of the obvious, Johnson thought.
Spangler prattled on about how he felt silly he hadn’t sold his stock
at seventy and how he felt bad that it now languished at fifty. His
family was peeved with him for not selling.
“I can’t tell you when it’s going back to seventy,” Johnson said, “all
I can do is run the company.” He was dying to get on the fairway.
Spangler proceeded to his idea: an LBO, at $70 dollars a share or so.
He and Sticht had already met with Citibank about it, Spangler said,
and the bank was enthusiastic.
Johnson was stunned. He and Sticht had what?
“Now my role is strictly advisory,” Sticht interjected.
Johnson looked at Sticht and thought: Your role is strictly ambushing,
you old dinosaur. But Johnson wasn’t built for confrontation, and fighting
with these two wasn’t going to get him anywhere, so he smiled. “Seventy dollars is okay by me, Paul.” It was a vintage performance.
Johnson would be the key, Spangler continued. He would own 15
percent of the company, with other managers owning another 10 percent. “Ross, I know a lot of wealthy people,” Spangler said. “You could
be a billionaire.”
Johnson left the meeting “in a state of goddamn shock”: What did
Sticht think he was doing? He might be an old fool, Johnson told himself,
but as a former chairman, he was a dangerous old fool. His presence
lent credibility to even a crazy proposal like Spangler’s. Didn’t Sticht
know Citibank’s chairman, John Reed, was a director of Philip Morris?
If this got out, it could be dynamite in a competitor’s hands.
Johnson dashed back to his condo and put out a flurry of calls. “Holy
smokes,” he told Andy Sage, who was in Jackson Hole. “I’ve been
blindsided. Spangler wants to buy the company!” He called Jim
Robinson. “All I know is he’s got a lot of money and he’s very close with Dick Jenrette,”
Robinson told him. Johnson grew alarmed; he knew what kind of firepower The Equitable had. “Get the goddamn executive committee together,” he told Harold Henderson later that day. Johnson was due at
an International Advisory Board meeting in Palm Springs Monday.
“I’ve got to talk with them as soon as I get back,” he said.
Johnson and his directors caucused Tuesday. They agreed that a
conversation with Citibank was called for, if only to see how far Spangler
had progressed. Johnson called John Reed and arranged a meeting.
Reed confirmed that the matter had come up, and suggested the bank
was willing to pursue it further. “The bank is here to serve,” he told
Johnson.
The following week Johnson picked up Spangler in North Carolina
and flew to New York. En route, Spangler showed him a computer
printout of various financial projections. It assumed that the company
could be held intact, that the necessary savings could come from
slashing capital expenditures. Johnson wasn’t impressed: Amateur hour,he thought.
For Johnson, the meeting at Citibank proved to be a huge relief. The
bank thought an LBO could be done at $65 a share, with Johnson taking
a 10 percent cut. It was clear they hadn’t done much work. Johnson was
openly cool toward the idea. On the flight back, Spangler was apologetic.
The matter, it was clear, would be dropped.
Johnson returned to Atlanta, dashed off “thanks-but-no-thanks” letters
to Citibank and Spangler, and sat down with Henderson to figure out
what to do about Sticht. He simply couldn’t be allowed to keep meddling in RJR Nabisco affairs. The next day Henderson flew to WinstonSalem and read Sticht the riot act. There were only two board meetings
before he was scheduled to retire in May. Sticht attended neither, much
to Johnson’s satisfaction. “We shipped him his silver tray, wrote all the
right things, and that was that,” recalled Johnson, certain he had seen
the last of Paul Sticht.
After the Spangler affair Johnson redoubled his efforts to boost his
sagging stock price. At the March board meeting, he gave directors two
options: buy Hunt Wesson, which would further emphasize the company’s tilt toward food, or buy back more stock. Having fewer shares
outstanding should buoy the price of the stock. The directors, none of
whom shared Johnson’s growing concern about the stock price, chose the latter.
Johnson had the buyback supervised by Ira Harris’s firm, Lazard Freres.
南海公司是一家身份特殊、业务创新的英国海外贸易公司，实际以金融投资为主业，1713年开始在伦敦股市酿出泡沫，1720年春夏南海股价骤升急跌，股市泡沫破裂，触发政坛动荡，同时也催生了市场监管、政府行为约束、潜在风险控制等现代金融市场要素的公共讨论。后人研究还发现假新闻对泡沫兴起和破裂所起的作用。
南海泡沫破裂，当时舆论哗然，各界群情激昂。政客义正词严地要求展开调查挖出元凶；南海公司董事会成员被批叛国、欺诈，被传召到议会出席问讯。文人墨客以诗歌、檄文，讽刺漫画和舞台戏剧抨击市场和那些被认为的始作俑者。英国财相一度被关押在伦敦塔。
风波最终平息之后，南海泡沫成了金融丑闻的同义词，逐渐又成为经济学一个专用名词，指脱离常规的投资狂潮引发的股价暴涨和暴跌，以及之后的大混乱。
要了解当年究竟发生了什么，需要先回顾一下现代金融市场的出现和早期的混沌状态。
据史料记载，伦敦金融市场的诞生跟1688-1697年那场欧洲大陆上的战争有直接关系。那场战争被称为九年战争、大同盟战争和其他一些名称。起因是法王路易十四在欧洲大肆扩张版图，遭荷兰、瑞典、神圣罗马帝国哈布斯堡王朝、英国和西班牙等国结盟抵抗。
为了筹集战争资金，英国统治当局从1690年开始在伦敦逐步建立具有现代金融市场元素的证券交易市场，1694年成立了中央银行 — 英格兰银行，发行了有史以来第一批国债，并且开始发行汇票，即一种带有“承诺付款”的代金券。
当时还开始盛行彩票、年金、股份公司、保险公司，以及各式各样的赚钱理财计划。欧洲大陆上，荷兰和法国金融投资业发展迅速，跟伦敦遥相呼应。伦敦金融市场就在这段时间积累了大量财富，不断壮大。
1713年，西班牙王位继承战争结束，根据《乌得勒支条约》，英国获得向西班牙控制的南美洲贩运奴隶的权利，每年一船黑奴，为期33年；作为回报，英国允许西班牙进入英国皇家非洲公司控制的非洲西海岸所有的英国致殖民地。
这时，南海公司已经成立两年。公司全名：大不列颠商人与南海及其他美洲各地通商并促进渔业的公司， 主营业务是海外贸易，股份制。
泡沫背后的真正原因很复杂。
南海公司跟政府做了一笔交易，从政府手里买断西班牙南海贸易的合同，然后政府发行的国债都打包交给南海公司管理，每年付利息。
买了国债的人可以把票据拿去折换成南海公司的股票，从政府的债主变成南海公司股东，不再拿债务利息，改拿分红股息。国债不能买卖，但南海公司的股票可以交易。政府则把自己的债主从无数公众变成一个，南海公司。
南海公司的创始股东包括财政大臣罗伯特·哈利（Robert Harley）和一位曾经经营彩票的金融家约翰·布朗特（John Blunt）。布朗特因为创办南海公司，后来还封了爵位。
南海公司与老牌奴隶贸易公司“皇家非洲公司”合作，从大西洋向南美运了数千名奴隶，还得到皇家海军护航。这更加深了公众对南海公司得到政府撑腰的猜测，因此对它的股票更放心、更热切。
到1720年夏天，南海公司的股票被高估，带动大市上涨，其他公司的股价也水涨船高。部分原因是许多新手进入股市盲目从众，还有一个原因是当时法国股市崩溃，不少投资资金流入伦敦，助燃了伦敦股市泡沫。
但是，南海公司向股东承诺的南美贸易活动和丰厚利润始终没有真正兑现，而公司的行为也越来越像一家银行，开始借钱给自家股票的潜在投资者，以维持市场需求，推高价格，巩固泡泡。
史学家爱丽丝·马普尔斯（Alice Marples）博士指出，当时卖给投资的股票数量是实际可以交易股票数量的一倍多，从新股东手里得来的钱被用来支付向老股东承诺的高额股息。现在有人形容那就像18世纪的庞兹骗局。
金融泡沫一旦开始膨胀，在一段时间内会迅速吸引更多各式各样的投资者，包括新手和投机者，股价被迅速哄抬到无法持续的高位，然后遇到最后一根稻草，或因为某个偶然契机，开始暴跌。南海公司的股票从1719年到1720年底，股价飙升10倍，于1720年8月触顶，然后断崖式跌落，到年底跌破初始价。
当时的人们没见过这种惊心动魄的跌宕。
狂欢盛宴结束
据一位古物和自然哲学家威廉·斯托克利（William Stukeley）在《艾萨克·牛顿爵士的回忆录》（1752年）所述，1720年9月，南海公司股价第一次垂直下跌后，“世界正处于极大的困扰之中，成千上万的家庭被毁”。这次股市崩溃最令人惊骇之处是社会各个层面几乎无一幸免，投资巨大的精英阶层成员和机构受打击尤其严重，包括皇家学会，曾担任皇家铸币厂厂长的物理学家艾萨克·牛顿（Isaac Newton）。
但是，也有幸运、精明的投资者在这几个月的股市跌宕中找准时机有所斩获，比如文具商托马斯·盖伊（Thomas Guy）在南海公司股价从峰值跌到一半时出售自己的持股，赚了一大笔，1721年用这笔钱在伦敦泰晤士河边建了盖伊医院（Thomas Guy Hospital），载入史册。
牵涉面如此之广的金融灾祸，议会不能不展开调查，然后发现内幕交易和贪污贿赂的证据，公司几个董事受到惩罚，包括位居内阁的高官。他们受到弹劾，私人资产和物业被没收用来补偿投资者，剩下的股份分配给东印度公司和英格兰银行。负责将国债打包给南海公司管理的财相艾斯拉伯（John Aislabe） 被撤职并一度监禁在伦敦塔。
最后，新上任的第一财政大臣罗伯特·沃波勒（Robert Walpole）通过巧妙的政治手段安抚公众，为王室和金融业止损，而南海公司继续运营，一直到1853年。
债务证券化、政府官员假公济私、投资公众盲从和市场的贪婪、变化莫测，似乎在300年前这场金融泡沫中登场。
英国南安普顿大学经济学和经济史讲师海伦·鲍尔（Helen Paul）认为，南海公司泡沫破裂，究其实质应该就是一桩丑闻，虽然社会各阶层都以不同形式和程度卷入其中，但跟1929年和2008年的股市泡沫破裂导致世界经济危机不同，之所以被如此重墨渲染成金融史上第一次重大危机，一个重要原因是假消息横行，引爆了公众集体愤怒和道德恐慌，即使公众对真正发生了什么事并不了解。
鲍尔指出，首先，这件事发生在证券市场早期阶段。这意味着监管、理论和法规都处于萌芽状态或者根本还没影子，财经记者这个概念还没出现。公众最容易获得的相关资讯就是口口相传的信息，包括无稽之谈和阴谋论。
其次，这件事越燃越烈的另一个原因是传闻投资者可以索赔，补回损失。所以，很多人便夸大自己的亏损。民间流传的亏损规模跟史料能够提供证据支持的损失相差极大。
再者，遇到这类影响范围如此之广又涉及钱财、股票投资的公共事件，舆情必然汹汹，必然会出现万夫所指的公敌，而那个年代最容易沦为替罪羊的是外国人和出头露面、参与金融投资的女性，还有不少宗教团体。
最缺乏的是客观冷静的报道和分析，于是丑闻二次发酵。
牛顿项目研究员马普尔斯博士认为，南海公司的业务包含大量政治元素，这是泡沫形成的一个重要因素，因为在公众心目中它的后台几乎就是政府，而且大量社会头面人物都加入了这种全新的理财投资活动。
更重要的是，这家公司似乎提供了一条从王公贵族到市井小民都能站在同一条起跑线上，共同“快速致富”之路。当时，从国王到女仆都买了南海公司的股票，交易盛况空前。
有过这种惨痛经历后，公众开始意识到市场的复杂性和反复无常。
马普尔斯博士指出，南海公司泡沫的破裂，再加上法国和荷兰等地陆续发生类似的市场风波，把金融投机、新金融投资工具的价值及其风险等新问题摆到公众眼前，推动了围绕市场监管的确立、政府行为规范及腐败风险管控机制的建立的公共辩论。
The theory is called Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).
It is challenging the neoliberal economic orthodoxy that has dominated policymaking in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and many other countries since the mid-1970s.
The reigning orthodoxy assumes a couple of things.
Firstly, it assumes every country has a “natural rate” of unemployment and it’s unwise to try to force the jobless rate below the natural level because inflation (and wages) will rise too quickly. Therefore, it assumes it’s better to accept a certain amount of unemployment to keep prices stable (and to keep wage demands weak).
At the moment, Australia’s natural rate of unemployment is assumed to be somewhere between 4 and 5 per cent.
Secondly, the economic orthodoxy holds that the national government needs to collect taxes, or borrow from savers, before it can spend money.
Politicians repeat this point incessantly.
When you hear a politician saying the government must “live within its means,” what they’re really saying is the government mustn’t spend more than it collects in taxes or borrowings.
However, MMT economists want to turn these orthodoxies on their head, among others.
MMT is a school of economic thought and a political project (more on this later).
Its proponents are not shy about their intentions to shake up the establishment.
The people who developed it have been working on the body of theory for decades, quietly, in countries such as Australia and the United States, but their ideas have recently burst out into the open as global leaders search for fresh ideas to deal with the unprecedented economic crisis of 2020, and the lingering effects of the global financial crisis in 2008-09.
MMT economists make several claims:
Firstly, they say we’ve been thinking about budget deficits incorrectly.
They say budget deficits are not always bad. In fact, deficits are often necessary and beneficial. A budget deficit is merely evidence of extra government spending, and government spending boosts the wealth of private sector businesses and households.
They say it depends what deficit spending is used for. Increasing the deficit to finance a war is not the same thing as increasing the deficit to build more hospitals and schools.
They argue investments that will enhance productivity through better health, greater knowledge and skills, improved transport and the like are worth funding, even if it results in a budget deficit.
Secondly, MMT economists say we’ve been thinking about government spending incorrectly.
They say the argument (promoted famously by British prime minister Margaret Thatcher) that national governments must tax or borrow before they can spend is wrong.
MMT argues it’s the other way around — national governments have to spend money into the economy before they can tax or borrow. Government spending actually precedes taxation.
Accepting this proposition is key to embracing MMT.
Thirdly, they say taxes are necessary, but not for the reasons you may think.
They say government taxes can be used to keep inflation under control, to control our behaviour (via fees and levies and rates), and to get us to produce things the government needs.
MMT economists draw on the ideas of chartalism to make this last point. They say governments use taxes to create demand for their own currency — that is, if a citizen has to pay tax then they’re going to have to work to earn the currency to pay the tax in that currency.
Essentially, governments use taxes to put everyone to work.
“At the end of the day, a currency-issuing government wants something real, not something monetary,” writes Professor Stephanie Kelton, one of the highest-profile MMT economists and a senior adviser to Bernie Sanders in both his 2016 and 2020 Democratic presidential primary campaigns.
“It’s not our tax money the government wants. It’s our time.
“To get us to produce things for the state, the government invents taxes or other kinds of payment obligations.”
Fourthly, MMT economists say countries that issue their own fiat currency can afford to buy anything that’s available for sale in their own currency, and they can never go bankrupt in their own currency.
“Fiat” money is government-issued currency that isn’t backed by any commodity, such as gold. It’s paper or digital money that has no intrinsic value. We’ll return to this point later too.
Fifthly, MMT economists say “full employment” is not only possible, it’s a moral imperative. Anyone who wants a job should have one.
They say we must prioritise genuine full employment and governments should spend whatever is necessary to achieve it — no matter the debt or deficit.
Sixthly, MMT economists say the national government should run a permanent “Job Guarantee” (JG) program to provide a job to everyone who wants one.
They say it could be linked to other economic and social programs, such as a “Green New Deal” — a policy advocated by MMT proponents linked to the US Democratic senator Bernie Sanders, to create jobs by shifting to zero-emissions technologies.
MMT’s theorists say world leaders still haven’t come to terms with the demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971.
During that era (1945 to 1971), certain currencies were pegged at agreed fixed rates against the US dollar, and the US dollar was supposed to be backed by gold reserves so it could be exchanged on demand for a fixed amount of gold held by the US government.
But that system was abolished by US president Richard Nixon in 1971 when the US admitted it did not have enough gold to back its currency.
After that, the US and other major sovereign currency issuers (including Australia) adopted “fiat” currencies — currencies with no intrinsic value, that aren’t backed by gold — with floating exchange rates.
MMT economists say this is significant because it means those countries (such as Australia, the US, Canada, the UK, Japan) no longer have to fear a shortage of gold, and that leaves them free to print as much money as they need to fully employ their “real” resources — workers, factories, machines, raw materials — within limits.
That insight is not new, nor particularly radical.
In a speech in 1997, then-US federal reserve chairman Alan Greenspan said central banks in the modern era could issue currency without limit.
“When there is confidence in the integrity of government, monetary authorities — the central bank and the finance ministry — can issue unlimited claims denominated in their own currencies and can guarantee, or stand ready to guarantee, the obligations of private issuers as they see fit,” Greenspan said.
“Central banks can issue currency, a non-interest-bearing claim on the government, effectively without limit.”
There are many criticisms of Modern Monetary Theory.
But at this point, it’s difficult to tell how many mainstream economists are making criticisms in good faith.
MMT has ruffled lots of feathers. It’s clear some orthodox economists don’t want to cede territory to the upstarts. Others won’t have wrapped their heads around the MMT logic yet. And there’d be some professional jealousy and rivalry behind the scenes.
However, some economists have scrutinised MMT seriously. Stephen Grenville, a former deputy governor of the RBA, being one of them.
While open to some of its ideas, he, like many other mainstream economists, argues it has fundamental flaws.
There’s no free lunch: Grenville says the chief vulnerability of the MMT narrative, and where MMT economists “are a little vague, even slippery,” is the MMT assumption, sometimes implicit, that budget deficits can be funded without adding to official debt.
“The government might get the cash to spend in its deficit by giving the central bank a bond in return for the cash,” Grenville wrote in the Eureka Report.
“But the bond is just a government debt which it owes itself, so in the view of many MMT supporters, the bond could be deleted from the central bank balance sheet by offsetting book entries in the accounts of the government and the central bank.
“In spending the cash to implement its deficit, the government shifts the economy to full-employment … GDP has increased without either debt or interest rates rising. This seems to be ‘free money’,” he said.
“It’s hardly surprising that this is an attractive narrative […] [but] this is clearly wrong.”
Human Behaviour: A major criticism of MMT has to do with the assumptions it makes about human behaviour, particularly about the way politicians “should” behave.
Professor Kelton, in her book The Deficit Myth, says unelected central bankers shouldn’t have so much control over the economy, and the responsibility for economic management should rest with elected representatives.
“We must end the cruel and inefficient practice of relying on democratically unaccountable central bankers to target the ‘right mix’ of inflation and unemployment,” Kelton wrote.
“To build an economy for the people, responsibility for maintaining full employment and income security must become the responsibility of elected representatives of the people.
“Congress, with its great power over the federal budget, must play an active and permanent role in stabilising output and employment through time.”
Cynics say handing that type of responsibility to politicians could be a recipe for disaster.
Would politicians have the ability to know when the economy has reached full capacity?
Would they have the backbone to raise taxes, perhaps during an election year, to keep inflationary pressures down? Would they have the discipline to stop spending?
United States authorities fined Citibank US$400 million over deficiencies in risk management practices and required an overhaul of internal controls at the global financial powerhouse, officials announced Wednesday.
The US Treasury’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued the fine, in parallel with a related action from the Federal Reserve citing failings at the bank.
The Fed said the crackdown reflected the fact Citi had “not taken prompt and effective actions to correct practices previously identified by the Board in the area of compliance risk management, data quality management and internal controls.”
The Fed said the issues date back to 2013, but had not been adequately addressed.
Under the settlement with the OCC, Citi promised to appoint a compliance committee that will provide quarterly updates to the company’s board on actions to improve compliance. Other requirements include upgrades to data collection and a staffing assessment to ensure adequate resources for compliance.
Citi said it was committed to righting its standing with regulators and would commit $1 billion in risk management-related programs in 2020.
“We are disappointed that we have fallen short of our regulators’ expectations, and we are fully committed to thoroughly addressing the issues identified in the Consent Orders,” the bank said.
“The entire management team is committed to achieving operational excellence and a best-in-class risk and control environment.”
The settlement with regulators came about a month after Citi appointed Jane Fraser as chief executive, the first woman from a major Wall Street bank to hold that post. Fraser will succeed outgoing chief Michael Corbat in February.
社论 2020年9月30日
尽管冠病疫情导致我国陷入经济衰退，但是房地产市场还是相当强劲。今年首八个月，新私宅销售量达6198个单位，比去年同期只下跌4.5%。其中，在8月份，发展商售出的新私宅数量，创下11个月来月销售量的最高水平。房地产分析师认为，今年全年的新私宅销售量有望超越去年的9912个单位。
另一方面，虽然私宅供应量激增，但是发展商并没有削价求售。今年第二季，市区重建局私宅价格指数环比上升0.3%。相比较之下，我国第二季经济环比萎缩42.9%，私宅价格走势比总体经济表现好得多。
房地产市场表现优异，主要原因是利率持续走低。银行存款利率微薄，再加上房贷利率下跌，吸引了不少组屋提升者以及投资者进场。在2014年，建屋局售出超过2万5000个单位的组屋，而隔年再发放超过2万3000个单位。这些组屋的屋主在今年满足了五年最低居住年限的规定，可以在公开市场脱售组屋，并成为新私宅的潜在买家。此外，在经济衰退下，私宅价格不跌反升，也令一些在场外等待多时的潜在买家投入市场。
但从市区重建局前天推出的新措施显示，发展商以及房屋经纪的促销方式，也可能是推动房地产市场的另一个原因。该局在发给发展商和律师等房地产业内人士的通知书中宣布，即日起限制发展商与买家一再延长买家选购权书，以确保买家谨慎购房。这项禁令也有助于防止发展商与房屋经纪炒高私宅销售数据，并减少哄抬房价的现象发生。
市建局在通知书中指出，虽然选购权书的有效期是三个星期，但是它发现到，有发展商在选购权书到期后，重新发出选购权书给同一个单位的同一个买家，以延长选购期的期限。因此，在新的措施下，它禁止发展商在一年内向同一单位的买家重新发出选购权书，并规定他们预先告知买家，以确保买家在选购期到期时有能力完成交易。
据业内人士反映，一般新推出的私宅项目，有三成至五成的买家会提出重新发出选购权书的要求，而有些选购期延长达18个月之久。这导致选购与最后签订买卖合约的数据出现落差，从而夸大了房地产的销售数据。在目前经济萎靡的情况下，这个落差可能扩大，并影响发展商的现金流与融资能力，尤其是小发展商。
另一方面，发展商为锁住买家而重发选购权书，也将鼓励冲动性的购屋与投机行为。那些最终无法如期完成买卖合约的买家，将在选购权书失效后损失相当于1.25%屋价的订金。以售价100万元的私宅为例，买家被没收的订金达1万2500元。
发展商以及房屋经纪若为了推高销售数据而钻法律空子或打擦边球，只会使房地产监管措施越收越紧。此外，通过延长选购权而吸引那些没有负担能力的买家，最终也不符合发展商以及房地产经纪的利益。在这一方面，产业发展商公会以及房地产代理理事会应对会员晓以大义，并监督害群之马，以减除条规进一步收紧的必要。
当然，买者自慎，买家更应该自律，尤其是在这个非常时期。宏观经济前景乌云一片，失业率以及裁员的情况将加剧。不少房贷贷款者，已向银行要求延付房贷本金或利息。因此，买家在买房前，应该做好财务规划，避免过度的承担。此外，房地产潜在供应量相当大，买家可货比三家，避免受哄抬价格的左右。
政府推出多轮的降温措施后，好不容易才驯服了脱缰之马的房地产市场。但健康的房地产市场，有赖于发展商、房屋经纪以及买家发挥自律的精神。当房地产市场走向稳健发展的道路时，相信政府将会逐步解除降温的措施。
金融机构和政府对加密货币的风险深感担忧–调查
周二公布的一项全球重要调查结果显示，金融机构和政府一边倒地认为加密货币存在风险，主要担忧包括比特币等数字货币有可能被用于洗钱和逃避制裁。
这项调查由智库皇家联合军种研究所和反洗钱师协会共同进行，调查中60%的受访金融机构、政府部门和民间部门人士表示，加密货币是一种风险，而非机会。最主要的担心在于非法使用。
这是迄今为止最为详细的调查之一，旨在反映对于加密货币的全球主流看法，揭示公众对于这项新技术的怀疑程度。
调查结果暗示，加密货币要获得普遍接受，还需要付出艰苦努力，目前世界各国都在考虑如何加强对加密货币的监管。上周的文件显示，欧盟将在2024年之前对某些加密货币推出新规则。
调查发现，加密货币作为犯罪使用的观感深植人心。来自金融机构的受访者中有近九成表示，他们担心加密货币被用来洗钱。超过八成的受访者担心遭到制裁的人或机构利用数字货币来绕过正规金融体系。
调查作者表示，“所有受访者都接受加密货币易沦为犯罪工具的看法。”
该研究发现，来自金融机构及其他民营公司的受访者中，只有五分之一认为数字货币是一项商机。他们提到的好处包括加密货币可以扩大金融服务的接触。
调查收到超过550份的回覆，受访者背景来自金融机构、执法单位、金融监管机构、法务及保险业者，也有来自加密货币行业。