分类： 未分类

当前，我国金融风险防范压力增大的主要原因，一是美国对中国发起贸易战带来经济增长不确定性，经济下行压力增大；二是国内经济面临结构调整、动能转换和产业升级，产能过剩等行业的企业贷款风险防控压力增大。我国三季度GDP增长率从6.2%下降至6.0%，经济面临更加严峻的内外部压力，银行业金融风险防范化解压力依然不容乐观。需要重点关注以下九个方面问题。

（一）资本管理

资本是银行吸收损失和抵御风险的最终手段，是衡量银行稳健经营的“硬指标”。根据《商业银行资本管理办法（试行）》规定，银行需要达到的核心一级资本充足率、一级资本充足率、资本充足率分别为7.5%、8.5%、10.5%，国内系统重要性银行则分别为8.5%、9.5%、11.5%。

总体来看，我国商业银行资本充足情况还比较理想，2019年6月末这三项指标分别为10.7%、11.4%、14.1%，均显著高于监管要求，且呈逐年上升态势。但在结构性上存在明显问题，其他一级资本占比明显偏低。从满足监管要求和降低成本角度出发，核心一级资本对资本充足率的贡献在6.5%~7.5%左右，其他一级资本和二级资本的贡献分别在1.5%~2%左右。2019年6月末商业银行其他一级资本的贡献率仅有0.7%，明显低于合理比例。而城商行和农村商业银行（以下简称农商行）的其他一级资本充足率更是大幅低于平均水平。

（二）公司治理

稳健的银行体系与公司治理状况密切相关，只有建立完善的公司治理架构，才能促进银行的稳健经营、防范银行风险。这在历次金融危机中获得了广泛共识。建立良好的公司治理可以树立客户的信心，鼓励更加稳定的、长期的资金流入，激励董事会和经理层正确履职、实现共同目标，也可以提升有效的监督和约束机制。公司治理没有最优，只有更优，不存在标准模式。有效的银行公司治理，不能是简单地追求利润和股东利益最大化，而应是各相关方积极参与的“共同治理”，既防范内部人控制，也防范一股独大、外部人不当干预。要遵循独立运作、相互合作、有效制衡、协调运转的原则，推动完善银行股权结构、优化法人治理架构、强化信息披露和外部监督，建立高效的决策和制约机制、科学的激励约束机制。

当前我国商业银行公司治理还存在诸多需要改进的方面：一是结构不完善。国内商业银行不同程度地存在着公司治理架构不健全、决策执行体系不合理、监督机制不够有效等问题。在这种形势下，内部控制不能有效地运行，从而导致监事会的监督功能实际缺失。二是缺乏管理人才。管理人才是构成企业发展的重要组成部分，管理人员的缺失问题是阻碍商业银行发展的关键因素，对于商业银行的可持续发展有着重要的影响。三是文化建设问题。公司治理结构框架的设定缺乏完善性，内部控制激励的政策机制没有形成，管理机制对于银行的管理程度弱化。这些问题，城商行显得尤为突出。2019年8月，中国银保监会通报了部分地方中小商业银行现场检查情况，共列出8大类31个典型问题，其中“公司治理不健全、股东股权管理不规范”这一类的问题最多，共有5条，分别是：一是股东入股资金来源不合规。有的机构个别发起人股东的入股资金来源主要为信托贷款资金。二是高管人员长期缺位。有的机构董事长长期缺位，未指定符合任职资格条件的人员代为履职；有的机构监事长长期缺位。三是“三会一层”履职不规范。有的机构未按规定对高管层及成员开展履职评价，评价结果未按时报告股东大会。四是重大关联交易管理不到位。有的机构发放单笔贷款金额超过资本净额1%，属于重大关联交易，未提交关联控制交易委员会审核并报董事会批准。五是违规向关系人发放信用贷款。

（三）信用风险

信用风险是银行存在的主要风险，不只出现在贷款中，也发生在担保、承兑和证券投资等表内、表外业务中，同时，信用风险贯穿整个商业银行信贷经营活动的各个阶段之中。所以信用风险管理是我国商业银行的核心竞争力，进一步提高信用风险管理水平，对于防范和化解商业银行金融风险意义深远。

截至2019年二季度末，我国商业银行不良贷款总额达2.24万亿元，较上季度末增长3.62%，不良贷款产生速度有所放缓，整体不良贷款率1.8%，其中，中小银行不良率依然处于上升趋势，城商行由2018年年末的1.79%上升至2019年6月末的2.3%，农商行一直维持在3.95%左右的高位。在此背景下，中小银行拨备覆盖率压力有所增大。截至2019年6月末，商业银行拨备覆盖率为190.6%，其中，大型商业银行的拨备覆盖率保持上升，接近250%，股份制商业银行逐步企稳，但城商行和农商行出现下滑趋势，城商行从2018年年初的214%下降到2019年6月末的149%，农商行从2018年年初的164%下降到2019年6月末的131%。

从以上数据看，2019年我国商业银行信用风险压力依然较大。2019年5月24日，中国人民银行总行和中国银保监会发布公告，鉴于包商银行出现严重信用风险，为保护存款人和其他客户合法权益，于即日起对包商银行实行接管，接管期限一年。根据报告，包商银行出现信用风险的主要问题在于其贷款质量堪忧，以及该行贷款集中度风险较高，早在2016年年底时，包商银行的最大10家贷款占资本净额的比例达到了28%。

当前，商业银行信用风险的防控仍面临较多挑战，主要包括以下几个方面：一是宏观经济运行仍存在一些深层次问题和矛盾。随着经济下行压力增大，部分行业和企业的潜在风险将逐步暴露。同时，当前经济处于产业结构升级、新旧动能转换阶段，部分传统产业进入调整期，新兴产业逐步发力，经济增长对投资的依赖度仍较高，经济内生增长动力还需要进一步增强。二是部分重点领域信用风险防范压力较大。全国房地产市场区域分化进一步加剧，商业地产投资持续低迷，写字楼空置率上升。中小房企销售金额同比明显下滑，房地产库存压力仍然较大。个别地区政府债务风险不容忽视，随着融资渠道收窄和存量债务集中到期，部分债务水平高、经济水平差、财政实力弱、融资平台过度依赖当地财政的地区融资平台的资金链压力持续增加。三是企业过度融资问题仍较为严重。近年来，一些企业通过开展多元化经营、提供关联担保、多渠道融资等方式获取远超实际经营需求的融资，形成债务规模大、杠杆率高、财务负担重、偿债能力弱的不良现象。在当前经济下行承压的背景下，较多企业陷入困境，出现现金流紧张。同时，商业银行也存在经营不够审慎的问题，普遍存在“垒大户”“搭便车”等情况，对企业多头授信、过度授信、贷款集中度过高等问题缺少有效的控制手段。四是外部风险冲击明显增强。中美贸易关系发展存在不确定性，商业银行与进出口相关的国际融资、跨境业务等面临一定的压力。

（四）流动性风险

目前，我国银行业流动性风险总体可控，2019年二季度末，商业银行流动性比例55.77%，人民币超额备付金率2.33%，人民币存贷比72.85%，流动性覆盖率稳步提升，平均流动性覆盖率达140%以上。但是，不同类型银行流动性分层现象日趋明显，大型银行长期以来扮演“批发行”角色，流动性最为充足，股份制银行流动性管理一直处于高压状态，而中小银行处于资金转移链条的末端，获得资金成本相对较高，流动性风险管理水平相对大型银行还有较大差距，特别是部分城商行还存在负债结构失衡、过度依赖同业负债、不重视基础客户导致储蓄存款比例低、期限错配严重等问题，在“去杠杆”和信用风险暴露的现阶段面临较大的流动性缺口，流动性风险将是未来一段时间内城商行面临的最严重挑战。

以包商银行为例，该行负债结构严重失衡，同业负债依赖程度高，2016年年末含债券同业负债达到了41.8%，2017年年末达到了48.6%，比例惊人。包商银行被接管事件正持续、深刻地影响原有金融生态，同业刚兑被打破，市场对中小银行普遍缺乏信任，银行依赖同业负债支持资产快速增长的模式已难以为继，流动性风险形势十分严峻。

（五）声誉风险

商业银行是高风险、高信用的金融企业，依靠品牌信誉和公众信心维持运转。银行声誉风险不可避免，它是社会进步、经济发展、银行变革过程中自然产生的，它既有不利的一面，会给银行带来负面影响和损失，同时又有有利的一面。在处置事件过程中，银行、客户及媒体之间通过交流沟通，找出问题所在，提出解决办法，相互得到理解，也推动银行不断改善服务，从某种意义上说，小的局部的风险事件也是银行实现转型发展的一个动因。特别是对于已上市的银行来说，信息披露要求更严格，业务及口碑受群众和监管部门的关注也更集中。

近年来，随着移动互联网和新媒体的产生，银行声誉风险突显，并越来越受到监管部门和业界的关注。网络信息技术的高速发展给负面金融舆情管理带来挑战，在互联网环境下，金融舆情的发展呈现以下趋势：一是舆论传播由传统媒体向自媒体、公共媒体方向发展。新兴的微博、博客、微信公众号、抖音等多种信息载体的快速发展使每个网民都能成为信息的发布者和传播者，极大加速了新闻传播的速度和范围，任何一件小事都可能会通过网上传播发酵成不能控制的局面，给银行声誉带来巨大损害。二是线上线下互动更加频繁。近年来网络舆论的影响范围逐渐从线上转到线下，通过和传统舆论之间的深入互动推动实践的进一步发展和解决。传统媒体具有很强的权威性，体现自上而下的舆论导向，而互联网舆情往往来自民众最底层，两者之间的互动互补，更进一步推动了舆情的发展。2019年6月，一篇名为《中年人的风平浪静，只能靠命》的文章迅速引起热议，招商银行P2P“钱端”业务负面舆情迅速传播，成为财经要闻TOP10之一，直到现在，“钱端”事件负面舆论仍在线下线上热议。

（六）市场风险

银行市场风险包括利率风险、汇率风险、股市风险和商品价格风险等，我国商业银行实施市场风险管理的主要目标是通过将市场风险控制在银行可以承受的合理范围内，实现经风险调整收益率的最大化。现阶段，利率风险是我国商业银行市场风险中最主要也是最重要的风险。央行2019年8月对市场报价利率（LPR）进行的改革，给银行带来较为复杂和综合的影响，具体而言，主要包括以下方面：一是银行利差将会收窄，利润会受到冲击。根据2019年10月20日第二次报价结果，LPR为4.20%，总体下降幅度较小，但2019年11月5日央行下调中期借贷便利操作（MLF）利率5个基点，而存款定价机制并未调整，银行依然会面临利差进一步收窄的冲击。二是银行利率风险管理难度加大。新的LPR市场化程度更高，银行必须根据市场利率的变化独立管理利率风险，在贷款和存款定价的过程中不仅要紧盯市场利率的趋势和变化，还也需要结合客户的差异化条件和行为施行差异化的定价策略。三是银行风险偏好将重塑。一方面LPR改革后优质客户的利率议价能力较强，银行为了达到利润目标，可能会被迫上调风险偏好以追求更高的信用溢价，导致信用风险上升。

（七）合规风险

合规风险是商业银行风险管理的核心之一，但实践中，合规风险管理一直未能得到足够重视，不少银行还存在“发展优先、合规让位”的思想。2016年被称为“金融监管风暴元年”，近几年不断升级，强监管已经成为中国金融发展的主旋律。尤其是2015年修订的银监会《行政处罚办法》，明确不仅要处罚机构，还要处罚人员；不仅要罚款，还要没收违法所得，罚款也要按违法所得数倍计算。据不完全统计，2016年，银监会开出罚单836张，罚没金额2.03亿元，处罚人员327人；2017年开出罚单3 452张，罚没金额29.32亿元，处罚人员1 500余名；2018年对银行业开出罚单3 813张，罚没金额20亿元，处罚人员1 500余名；2019年前三季度，对银行业开出罚单2 530张，罚没金额6.8亿元，处罚人员1 200余名，其中62人被取消高管任职资格，37人被处以最严厉的个人处罚——终身禁止从事银行业工作。2019年9月12日，银保监会首席风险官肖远企接受采访时明确表示，严监管的取向没有变，对违法违规、扰乱市场秩序行为的严监管不会放松。从处罚案由来看，信贷业务违规被罚最多，约占处罚案例的44%，票据、理财投资、同业业务、乱收费等也是处罚的“重灾区”，这些领域都是银行的主要业务方向，商业银行务必要严格遵守监管规定，狠抓合规建设不放松。

（八）操作和案件风险

巴塞尔委员会认为，操作风险是指由于不完善或有问题的内部操作过程、人员、系统或外部事件而导致的直接或间接损失的风险。操作风险是现阶段商业银行在业务的经营和发展中要面对的主要风险。近年来，虽然我国商业银行建立健全了防范违纪违法案件的组织架构和内控制度，但银行操作和案件风险问题频发，其影响力和破坏力逐渐增强。比如：2016年农行 “39亿元票据案”、2017年广发银行 “侨兴债”违规担保案、2017年浦发银行成都分行违规放贷向1 493个空壳企业授信775亿元案、2018年邮储银行79亿元违规票据案等。从这些案件中，我们可以看出现在我国商业银行在操作风险的管理和控制上还有较大的漏洞，主要表现在以下几个方面：一是理念和认识不足。银行监管审查部门对于操作和案件风险的事前防范、事中控制措施少，而主要重视事后处置。同时，对高管的监管不足，而是把精力集中于基层员工，一旦管理层操作失误或存在道德风险，就容易引起案件风险。二是体系和框架不健全。有的商业银行未建立专门的风险管理委员会，不能及时有效地对风险进行监测和应对，对于风险管理不集中，不能系统地对风险加于控制，对于操作和案件风险的管理缺乏完善科学的处理方法和程序。三是人为因素。人为因素是引起操作风险的重要原因，主要包括银行从业人员的思想道德素质、行为习惯、业务能力等方面。许多重大的银行案件都是由内部欺诈和外部欺诈所造成，甚至一些系统问题也是由于工作人员疏忽所造成的。

（九）信息科技风险

随着信息技术和金融的相互融合，信息技术已成为现代银行业务发展创新的催化剂，推动商业银行进入科技引领的新时代。在银行广泛深入应用信息科技的同时，银行业也面临着巨大的信息科技风险，信息科技风险是唯一能导致业务瞬间中断的风险，一旦信息科技出现问题，轻则影响银行业务运营和客户服务，严重时可能危及银行的生存和发展，甚至会影响国家安全和社会稳定。目前，信息技术快速发展带来的金融安全风险主要有以下几点：一是网络安全风险。互联网应用的普及使金融机构可以通过互联网在任何地点、以多种方式向客户提供服务，在给群众生活带来方便、快捷的同时，也带来了风险和挑战。根据国家互联网应急中心发布的2019年上半年互联网网络安全态势报告显示，2019年上半年，应急中心对105款互联网金融APP进行检测，发现安全漏洞505个，其中高危漏洞239个。这些数据反映出金融机构在网络安全的管理意识、安全制度以及安全措施等方面还存在不足。如果一旦遭到黑客或者病毒攻击造成信息的丢失、泄露，将会使金融机构遭受无法估量的损失。二是基建滞后存在隐患。2014年7月1日，宁夏某银行核心系统数据库因版本严重老化出现故障，导致该行（含异地分支机构）存取款、转账支付、借记卡、网上银行、ATM和POS业务全部中断，时间长达37小时40分钟；2018年11月3日，重庆某银行机房电池老化失火引起火灾。这些事件对商业银行具有重要警示意义，如果灾备系统建设滞后，会给业务连续性带来严重挑战。三是信息系统外包引发的风险。2016年4月22日，北京亦庄某数据中心供电中断，造成某村镇银行和多家金融机构托管在该机房的所有设备宕机，服务全部中断。随着金融机构对信息系统外包依赖的程度不断增强，范围不断扩大，信息系统外包给金融机构正常运营和发展带来的风险也越来越多。如何管理信息系统外包服务，如何量化服务，如何保证外包项目的质量，是金融机构在控制外包风险过程中应密切关注的问题。

从县域金融说起

我们有一个团队对西部地区县域金融服务持续关注了大概十多年的时间。

县域金融服务提供者主要分为两类，一类是在县域的法人银行，现在主要是信用社，农商行或者农合行，村镇银行。第二类机构是其他大银行在县上的支行。

目前县域这些农合机构，属于县域法人机构，存贷比大部分都在60%、70%、80%，有的能超过100%，而对这些大行的县支行，主要是国有商业银行的县支行，存贷比有的很高，有的超过100%，有的60%、80%，也有相当一部分30%、40%，也有不少存贷比10%，5%，甚至0%。0%是什么概念？就是没有贷款，只吸收存款，除过邮储，邮储还撇开不说。

在这种情况下，很多地方政府领导对这些大行在县上的支行信贷比低于20%，10%，5%，很有意见，说你光在这我这吸收存放不发贷款，就找金融监管部门要求想办法。

讨论的时候，有两种思路，一种认为我们应该尊重市场的选择，市场决定资金的流向，要尊重市场运行结果，市场自由选择我们听市场的。反对的人把第一种看法总结为市场的原教旨主义，提出不能听任市场，地方政府是有道理的，如果只在我这吸收存款，不发放贷款，贷款发放的力度太小也是有问题的，所以支持采取比较强的政府干预，甚至有人提出来你吸收100的存款，存贷比必须达到40%50%，想搞一种政府强制的比例。

当时我们团队关注这个问题的时候，认为走这两种极端都是不可取的，人为命令不可取，原教旨市场主义也是不可取。怎么办？

县域金融服务的评估体系：
主要针对县域非法人机构

我们团队2010年设计了县域金融机构支持地方经济社会发展的评估体系。评估三个方面：一是信贷投放（如存贷款市场份额、存贷比、不良率等），二是提供的金融服务（如自然人和企业客户覆盖率、银行网点数量、可统计的结算交易金融增长率、税收贡献、同业评价、监管部门评价、政府评价、客户满意度等等），三是当地的金融生态（如经济增长率、财政收入增长率、企业亏损面、工业用电增长率、金融债务案件结案率和执行率、居民收入、教育支出占财政支出比重和每千人口医院卫生院床位数，地方政府行政效率和管理水平、政府支持金融发展情况和政府支持金融机构自主经营情况以及政府、金融机构对该县经济发展的预期等等），设计了45个指标。

这些指标里面有定量的指标，也有定性的指标。定量的指标比方说贷款增速，存款增速，余额存贷比，不良率等等。定性的指标采取调查问卷的形式，机构之间相互打分，给同行进行打分，给当地的金融生态打分。

评估的结果分四档，一档优秀，二档达标，三档需要提高，四档不合格。

这个评级体系到现在已经做了10年。评估总共追踪县域金融机构大概400家。分到D档，就是不合格类，每年一般不到10家。D档共性的一点是存贷比一般为5%，1%，0%。
存贷比低的原因：

（1）有的所在县属于国定贫困县，无工业企业，贷款需求小。企业规模小，企业评级低，也达不到总行的信贷准入要求；

（2）有的上级行没有给县支行公司类贷款授权；

（3）有的上级行严禁对县上的酒吧、茶楼和娱乐场所放贷；

（4）力量不够，有个县支行员工12人，其中3人属于合同派遣制；

（5）有个县支行公司贷款全部为不良，农户贷款不良高，上级行停了县支行贷款业务，只收不贷；

（6）县上没有担保体系等等。

当然，存贷比低，比如为5%并不必然是不合格。有些县，县域金融生态太差，这类机构的评估也会分到前三档。地方的同志要高度关注这点，当地的金融生态太差的话，钱是留不住，不光贷款不来，存款也可能走掉。这个不光是十年前发生，现在也在发生，县一级在发生，市一级也在发生，个别阶段在个别省也在发生。

尺度的把握：

一是评级的时候有弹性。把多少能够放到D档即不合格类不是没有弹性。如果强调市场自由、强调发挥市场作用，就可以把越来越少的放在D档去。如果强调政府干预，就可以把更多放到D档，更多放到C档。弹性取决于大环境。

二是也要避免极端。我们观察一个县，一个国有商业银行县支行存贷比50%，存款6个亿，贷款3个亿，存贷比50%。后来发生了很大的自然灾害，全国开始支援，救援资金，中央和省上资金大量朝这个县流动，这个县上几个月之内存款大量增加，虽然国有商业银行县支行贷款投放的力度比往年大，但是存贷比却还是从50%降到12%，因为援助资金流入形成大量存款。对这些指标要客观看待，不能太绝对。

第三，对这些资金从县域流出，流向地市、省会、外省，应该放在我们国家城市化工业化的大背景下来看待、来分析。在工业化和城市化的过程中间，所有要素，不光是资金，可能包括劳动力，包括人口都要朝一些区域集中。需要研究的一点是，有些时候是不是由于资金从基层从县域跑出的太快，自然而然生长的城市化还并不需要那么大面积的那么快的集中，但是资金朝大城市房地产，朝大城市大项目快速集中，催快了城市化，资金太快从基层县域流出会不会人为拉动拔苗助长式的城市化，而且这种城市化不符合城市客观成长规律、由于催熟而问题多多？这个我没有答案，只是一个观察。

第四，对地方政府而言，考核一个金融机构对地方的支持，不能只看给你投放了多少贷款。要看他投放贷款的力度，也要看他提供的金融服务，更要改善县域自己的生态环境。只有你这个生态环境好了，在你这个区域大家都讲诚信了，口碑好了，钱可能才能“流”进来，钱可能才能“留”下来。

上面这两点主要讲的主要是国有商业银行县支行对基层政府和基层管理部门面临的一个问题。县支行是非法人机构，下边就过渡到地方的法人机构。

县域法人金融机构

县域法人金融机构主要是农合机构，信用社、农商行、村镇银行等。

这两年我们很多地方政府非常积极推动农村信用社改革，方案设计中有的想把全省的信用社拉直，省上搞一个省级全牌照农商行，县上这些农商行信用社保持法人地位，但是省级农商行进行对其参股或者控股。有的省的方案，成立一个省级农商行，全省就这一个法人，各县上的联社、各县农商行变成省级农商行的县支行，即超级省级农商行模式。

搞成省级农商行之后，对县域支农支小，支持县域经济发展力度肯定要减小。我们有案例，有几个地方全市行政辖区搞了统一法人的农商行，各县信用社变成其支行。根据这么多年的数据看，这些个农商行县支行的存贷比甚至低于当地国有银行县支行的存贷比。当然，统一法人之后，响应地方党委的能力大大增强，主要投向大城市大项目，实实在在影响到了县域支农支小的力度。

我国现在不缺大银行，所以这次信用社改革过程中，一定要保持农村信用社、县级农商行法人地位的稳定。

西部地区中小银行风险化解的问题

根据央行上半年的评级，西部地区高风险中小银行的家数占西部地区中小银行家数比重要高于全国高风险中小银行占全国中小银行的比重，西部地区高风险中小银行的总资产占西部地区中小银行总资产的比重高于全国的比重，这两个都高于全国的比重4个百分点。

西部地区也要重视中小银行的风险化解。强调五点：

一是集中有限的资源攻坚重点风险点。不能撒胡椒面。不能避重就轻，越捂盖子未来的危险越增大。

二是化解风险过程中，老股东必须承担责任，股权清零，老股东出局。

三是地方政府一定要拿出真金白银，不能一味向中央要。

四是一定要完善公司治理。出险的商业银行风险处置过程中，发现一个最大的问题是坏股东，坏股东掏空银行。这在西方发达市场经济国外两百年之前发生，当时商业银行成为股东商业帝国的提款机。我们两百年之后是不是也要把这个错误重新犯了之后，摔疼之后才纠正这个错误，还是我们吸取别人的教训，更好地避免这些错误。完善公司治理一定要把好准入关，把股东选好。

五是处置风险过程中地方政府要负起属地责任。有的地方政府认为他们对银行的资本充足率、流动性比例、关联交易不知道、没法查，异地贷款什么情况也不掌握，什么数据都不掌握，地方政府有一些怨言，不是没有道理。处置金融风险，地方要负属地责任，各监管部门的监管的有效性也要不断地提高。

In the Treasurer’s own words, this week’s June quarter economic growth figures were “devastating”.

Australia’s economy shrank 7 per cent in just three months — that’s more than three times the next worst result on record (-2 per cent in 1974), and at least two years’ worth of good growth wiped out.

Most economists expect it will take until sometime in 2022 for the economy just to get back to where it was before the COVID-19 pandemic, others warn it might be 2023.

Given that, and forecasts that unemployment will peak at about 10 per cent by year’s end, many people are asking why we aren’t talking about a depression instead of a recession.

There’s a few reasons.

The Depression was really, REALLY, bad

The 7 per cent quarterly fall may be the worst recorded in Australia, but those records from the Bureau of Statistics only go back to 1959.

For the year to June 2020, the Australian economy shrank 6.3 per cent, and economists generally think that’s about as bad as it will get, with most predicting a modest rebound in the current September quarter, despite Melbourne’s lockdown.

Compare that to the Great Depression.

Even though we don’t have directly comparable ABS figures, reliable estimates put the economic collapse at the beginning of the Depression in 1928-29 at 6.2 per cent — so pretty similar to what we’ve just seen.

But the economy fell a further 9.7 per cent in 1929-30 and, to rub salt into those wounds, another 2.1 per cent in 1930-31.

Economist Terry Rawnsley from SGS Economics and Planning said it was the three years of constant, severe economic decline that marked out the Depression as unique.

“In total, the Australian economy declined by 17.1 per cent during the three-year period,” he observed.

In a 2009 speech, the now head of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, David Gruen, made a similar observation comparing the Depression to the global financial crisis.

“What turned a recession in the 1930s into the Great Depression was the continued collapse in economic output for the subsequent two years, before recovery took hold in 1933.”

The continued falls in economic activity saw unemployment surge from 4.2 per cent to a peak of almost 20 per cent, and then remain above 11 per cent until the mid-1930s.

This high level of unemployment in turn meant fewer people with incomes to spend, which prolonged and deepened the downturn.

Unemployment didn’t drop back pre-Depression levels until the mass mobilisation for World War II.

Right now, unemployment is officially 7.5 per cent and expected to rise to about 10 per cent by year’s end.

The real rate of joblessness is probably above 11 per cent, and there is a lot of underemployment, but it is not as bad as during the Depression.

So, unless we have to endure second, third, fourth and fifth waves of COVID-19 without a vaccine or effective treatment, the current downturn looks likely to be a lot shorter and less severe than the Depression.

And, even if we end up experiencing an economic decline similar to the Depression, remember that we’re starting from a much higher base, with average incomes at the onset of the Great Depression around a fifth of what they are now, in real terms.

Governments weren’t much help in the Depression

Economic mismanagement played a key role in turning the stock market crash of 1929 and the recession that followed into the Great Depression.

“The classical economic approach involved reducing wages and trying to balance their budgets,” Terry Rawnsley explained.

“All of which just further reduced aggregate demand in the economy and worsened the Great Depression.”

Not only did governments generally slash spending in response to their falling revenues and rising debts, they also didn’t provide even much basic support for the growing ranks of unemployed.

In his 2009 speech, Dr Gruen observed that Commonwealth unemployment and sickness benefits weren’t introduced until 1945.

“During the Great Depression, state governments had a support payment called ‘the susso’, short for sustenance payments,” he said.

“These varied by state but provided bare minimum support, with strict controls on what could be purchased with the coupons provided.”

They didn’t pay the rent, which saw many shanty towns and tent cities spring up around the country, and inspired this children’s ditty:

We’re on the susso now,

We can’t afford a cow,

We live in a tent,

We pay no rent,

We’re on the susso now.

The contrast with the modern response to severe economic downturns couldn’t be more stark.

In early 2009, the Rudd government announced a $42 billion stimulus package to help offset the effects of the global financial crisis — unlike most developed countries, Australia avoided recession.

That stimulus has already been dwarfed by the Morrison Government’s response to COVID-19, just as the initial economic downturn from the GFC has been dwarfed by the global coronavirus-induced recession.

In his July update to Parliament, Treasurer Josh Frydenberg said the Government was providing “economic support for workers, households and businesses of around $289 billion”.

This week’s National Accounts show that record government subsidy payments of nearly $56 billion were made in the June quarter alone.

The combination of cash handouts and a coronavirus boost to welfare payments, along with an increased number of unemployed on JobSeeker, saw a stunning 41.6 per cent jump in social assistance benefits.

Despite a record 2.5 per cent drop in wages, the extra welfare payments meant the average disposable income rose 2.2 per cent.

The Depression was an economic crisis

Another big difference between the COVID recession and the Depression is implied by the former’s name.

While Australia’s economy wasn’t going great even before the pandemic hit — the 0.3 per cent slide in GDP in the March quarter pre-dated most of the lockdown effect and even got a boost from panic grocery buying — it wasn’t in crisis.

Debt the common factor

However, while this recession was triggered by a health crisis, there is a real risk it could morph into a financial one.

If that occurred it could see a short, sharp recession morph into a longer-term depression.

The main risk of this happening is one of the same factors that made the Great Depression so severe — debt.

Back in the 1920s, in the lead-up to the Depression, Australia’s problem was public debt.

“Total government gross debt was already well over 100 per cent of GDP before the onset of the Great Depression,” Dr Gruen explained.

“With fixed interest loans denominated in pounds sterling these levels increased to a peak of 205 per cent of GDP in 1931–32.”

The Government debt was so high that the UK’s banks — our main financiers at the time — didn’t want to lend us any more money, especially once the Depression hit. They wanted repayments instead.

Customers now expect banks to maximize digital interactions and come up with digital alternatives for their day-to-day banking needs as they are now more open to trying out a new app than they were before the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the last few years, banking as an industry has seen a massive move towards digitization. Traditional banks are challenged by new-age, digital only banks that rely on replacing the traditional banking experience with a hyper-personalised digital first approach. In addition, banks need to boost their Return on Equity, bring down Cost to Income ratio etc. in order to stay competitive. Banks have also been facing threats from new entrants such as Google, Amazon and other technology companies looking to enter this space. COVID-19 has accelerated some of these trends, like changed customer behaviour and adaptation of newer tools and technologies by the banks.

Surveys observed rapid increase in customer reluctance to visit branches and they are inclined to try out newer tools to meet their banking needs. Banks have been closing branches globally at an unprecedented scale. Citigroup closed about 100 branches and JP Morgan, the largest bank in the US closed about 1000 branches in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic.

Customers now expect banks to maximize digital interactions and come up with digital alternatives for their day-to-day banking needs as they are now more open to trying out a new app than they were before the COVID-19 pandemic.

Digital Banking – Way Ahead

In the post COVID world, digital banks will need to replace many of the customer’s existing transactions and interactions with the bank by improved use of technology.

To achieve this, they will need to build a robust, scalable technology platform focusing on the following components:

-Omni Channel

Banks need to ensure that their channels are streamlined to ensure seamless and superior customer journeys across channels. Traditionally, banks have had siloed channels with customized workflows and support. This approach is inherently inefficient and leads to broken customer journeys, staff and customer dissatisfaction and increased costs. To achieve a true omni-channel experience, banks have to re-engineer their platforms to be digital first. Workflows, customer journeys and experiences should be orchestrated through a central hub and then distributed to individual channels.

Mobile banking will be at the heart of omni-channel banking soon. An added advantage of mobile banking is that it can offer near real-time communication avenues to banks. Also, access and authentication can be handled through a mobile’s in-built security mechanism. Banks should focus on generating omni-channel experiences that are mobile friendly and can be repurposed across other channels.

-Modular Banking

Customers expect increased dynamism at the front end. However, legacy bank systems are monolithic in nature leading to potential delays in implementing changes, increased time to market for new products along with an unpredictability of outcome.

To address this, banks must focus on decoupling existing monoliths to begin with. However, this will not be enough for banks to compete with digital only banks. Banks will need to incorporate a platform that at its core is “digital first”. This means the breaking down of functionality into smaller components that can be combined to alter processes and products as needed.

Having a truly “digitally advanced” platform will allow P&L owners within the bank to design and technology & engineering functions to develop and deliver new products and services rapidly.

-Open Banking

Traditionally, banks didn’t require to share data with competitors or other service providers. Some banks used their data to improve their services and products, however there was no obligation for them to share this data with third parties or competitors. Open Banking and PSD2 have changed this in Europe and it is now likely that regulators world-wide would follow their European counterparts and require banks to get acccess to the customer data to third parties and competitors based on customer’s consent.

Open Banking will create opportunities for banks that are open to alliances with Fintechs and other third-party products, thus offering customers an end-to-end experience. Banks will need to open up their APIs and tap into third party capabilities to dramatically improve customer experience and build deep, lasting relationships with their customers.

-Intelligence Driven

Traditional approaches to customer service, cross-selling and recommending products to the customers have relied on a “One size fit all” approach. With a bigger scale, financial penetration and reduced customer interaction, there is a clear opportunity for banks to use data to personalize customer experiences, recommendations, and services.

By integrating different kinds of customer data (demographic, transaction, interaction, behaviour, application usage etc.), banks can create unique experiences for each customer by leveraging technologies such as Cognitive Computing, Machine Learning, Natural Language Processing etc.

In the post-COVID world, customers will need to feel unique and cared for even when they interact with banks over digital channels.

Digital Banking experience will be a game changer for enhancing customer satisfaction post-COVID. Banks need to take a holistic view and invest across all pillars of digital banking to retain existing customers and acquire new ones.

Total liabilities of the government increased to Rs 101.3 lakh crore at end-June 2020 from Rs 94.6 lakh crore at end-March 2020, according to the latest data on public debt.

The total debt of the government stood at Rs 88.18 lakh crore at end-June 2019.

Public debt accounted for 91.1 per cent of total outstanding liabilities at end-June 2020, the quarterly report on public debt management released on Friday said.

Nearly 28.6 per cent of the outstanding dated securities had a residual maturity of less than five years, it said, adding the ownership pattern indicates a share of 39.0 per cent for commercial banks and 26.2 per cent for insurance companies at end-June 2020.

During the first quarter of the current fiscal, the central government issued dated securities worth Rs 3,46,000 crore as against Rs 2,21,000 crore in the same period a year ago.

The weighted average maturity (WAM) of new issuances stood at 14.61 years in the quarter as against 16.87 years in the fourth quarter of the last fiscal, according to data collated by Public Debt Management Cell (PDMC).

During April-June 2020, the Central Government raised Rs 80,000 crore through the issuance of Cash Management Bills.

The Reserve Bank conducted one special OMO involving simultaneous purchase and sale of government securities for Rs 10,000 crore each during the quarter ended June 2020.

The net average liquidity absorption by RBI under Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) including Marginal Standing Facility and Special Liquidity Facility was Rs 4,51,045 crore during the quarter.

G-Sec yields have shown a moderating trend in the first quarter of the fiscal with the rate declining to 5.85 per cent compared to the weighted average yield of 6.70 per cent in the previous quarter.

“This reflected the impact of several developments namely a sharp decline in crude oil prices during April 2020, reduction in the repo rate by 40 basis points to 4 per cent by the Monetary Policy Committee on May 22, 2020 and surplus liquidity conditions in the market,” it said.

Central government dated securities continued to account for a major share of total trading volumes in the secondary market with a share of 74.0 per cent in total outright trading volumes in value terms during the first quarter of the current fiscal.

The gross fiscal deficit (GFD) of the Central Government for 2020-21 has been budgeted at Rs 7,96,337crore or 3.5 per cent of GDP as compared to the revised estimate of Rs 7,66,846 crore (3.8 per cent of GDP) and the provisional estimate of Rs 9,35,635 crore (4.6 per cent of GDP) for 2019-20.

During April-June 2020, fiscal deficit at Rs 6,62,363 crore worked out to be 83.2 per cent of the budget estimate as compared to 61.4 per cent of the budget estimate in the corresponding quarter of 2019-20. 

研究表明零利率比负利率更有效 警告央行勿陷入负利率泥潭

在欧洲央行将指标利率降至零以下的六年后，行为金融学大师们向正在考虑尝试负利率的其他央行发出了一个信息：不要冒险。

美国、英国、挪威、澳洲、新西兰、以色列和加拿大的利率都在0.25%或更低，这些国家中有一家或者更多央行很有可能会降息至零以下，以应对新冠疫情引发的经济滑坡。

货币市场走势显示，英国央行可能会在2021年实施负利率，而新西兰央行已要求各银行为负利率做好准备。

然新研究似乎强化了一些决策者长久以来的担忧，即负利率是无效的，或许甚至适得其反。

“如果你的目标是鼓励一些人提高杠杆(债务)并扩大投资风险资产，零利率实际上比负利率更有效，”以色列国家债务管理部门负责人Lior David-Pur表示。

David-Pur是上个月发表在行为与实验经济学杂志上的论文的作者之一。该篇论文发现，当利率从1%降至0%时，对冒险和借贷行为的正面影响最大。

这或多或少与今年从美国到澳洲等央行的降息举措一致。

该论文是对消费者对负利率反应的罕见研究，它追踪了205位学习经济学的大学生的投资决策，这些大学生被分为四组，每组有10,000以色列谢克尔(2,921美元)，可以在无风险的银行存款和股票等风险资产之间分配。

利率原本介于2%至负1%，调降1个百分点之后，向受访者询问他们是否会想要扩大借贷用于投资，若有会是借多少。

David-Pur表示，利率降到负1%的这组受访者实际上减少杠杆1.75%。但是利率降到零的这一组受访者的借款意愿提高20%。

“对于人们而言，零本身具有特殊意义，”David-Pur表示，并称一旦利率为负值，借钱投资的杠杆会下滑。

目前在法国兴业银行工作的前欧洲央行经济学家Anatoli Annenkov指出，这是因为负利率可能暗示“某种紧急状态”。

“这本身意味着负利率没办法达到理想中的效果，因为人们可能只会存更多，而非把钱拿来消费。”

的确，2014年过后欧元区储蓄率曾短暂下降，但随着官方指标利率进一步跌至零以下，储蓄率一路上升。

实践证明负利率并不成功

批评者一直以来都指出，欧元区和日本实施了数年的负利率，但无论通胀还是经济成长都没有出现反弹。

瑞典隆德经济与管理学院副教授Fredrik N G Andersson表示，负利率让瑞典经济付出的成本可能超过了收益。

瑞典去年将指标利率提升到了零水平。

Andersson曾仔细研究过这个问题，他表示当利率为负时，借贷的确会增加，但借来的钱最终多数投向了房地产，推高了房价，也加重了家庭债务。

“这不同于你借了钱去购买了一辆车或者什么可以增加GDP的东西。当你借钱买房子时，对经济并没有刺激效果，”他说。

他补充表示，企业主已经暂停投资，呼应Annenkov提出的负利率被视为危机信号的看法。

银行向储户实施负利率？

德国明斯特大学的另一项实验发现，如果发现无风险的利率–例如银行存款利息–转为负值，那么超过300名自愿“投资者”的冒险行为可能会发生改变。

尽管负利率经济体的银行鲜少对储户实施负利率，不过明斯特大学副教授Hannes Mohrschladt表示，如果欧洲央行继续降息，就有可能发生。

但他警告欧洲央行应该要注意降息“可能进一步推升股市与房地产市场的价格。”

Andersson则表示，证据表明央行并不需要负利率来刺激增长。

“我会说别这么做，不值得这么做。”

The Federal Reserve kept rates unchanged Wednesday, and reiterated that monetary policy would remain accommodative for a prolonged period to support the economy’s ongoing recovery.

The Federal Open Market Committee left its benchmark rate unchanged in the range of 0% to 0.25%.

The unchanged decision comes just weeks after Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell unveiled the central bank’s average inflation targeting regime, designed to allow inflation to overshoot its 2% target in an effort to achieve long-term price stability. The move has raised expectations that rates could be held near zero for longer than would have been the case under the Fed’s previous target, with some market participants forecasting no rate hikes for some time.

The latest economic projections from the Fed appear to support expectations for rates to remain lower for longer, with policymakers backing the central bank to keep its benchmark rate unchanged at 0.1% through 2023.

Many argue that the Fed had raised rates too quickly in the Financial Crisis era, on expectations that inflation would eventually trend toward target, underpinned by a hot labor market. The new approach seeks to avoid a repeat of inflation running below target for a prolonged period.

“With inflation running persistently below this longer-run goal, the Committee will aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time so that inflation averages 2 percent over time and longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored at 2 percent,” The Fed said in a statement. “(I)t will be appropriate to maintain this target range until labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with the Committee’s assessments of maximum employment and inflation has risen to 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time.”

The Fed’s pledge to keep rates near zero and persist with asset purchases has helped support an uptick in economic activity.

The central bank expects the economy to contract by 3.7% in 2020, compared with an estimate for a 6.5% decline previously. But growth in 2021 and 2022 was revised lower to 4% and 3% from 5% and 3.5% respectively.

The stimulus measures have spurred a rebound in the pace of inflation and the labor market, which currently tracking above expectations.

Earlier this month, the Labor Department reported the unemployment rate fell to 8.4%, while core PCE inflation, the Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, came in at 1.3%.

In the wake of the stronger data, the Fed revised its unemployment rate forecasts for the year to 7.6%, down from 9.3% previously. While inflation is expected to pick up pace and reach 1.2% by year-end, up from a previous forecast of 0.8%.

Looking ahead, the bank sees unemployment falling to 4.6% by 2022, down from a prior estimate of 5.5% previously. While inflation for 2021 and 2022 was revised higher to 1.7% and 1.8% from 1.6% and 1.7% respectively, but is set for a faster climb to about 2% in 2023.

The Fed’s balance sheet has increased in recent weeks to over $7 trillion, nearing the June peak of about $7.2 trillion.

If not, arrears could double to a rate higher than the Great Recession in 2009

Housing markets in Canada are on the mend. Sales data from the Greater Toronto Area showed considerable increases in sales and prices in August. With the mortgage deferral programs set to expire in September and October, housing market recovery might lose steam or even face significant challenges. 

Earlier in March, the uncertainty about the resumption of economic activity and the public health impacts of COVID-19 was high. Many borrowers, who were uncertain about their jobs, opted for mortgage deferral as a precaution. By mid-April, 600,000 borrowers had applied for mortgage deferrals. At its peak, over 700,000 mortgages had been in some form of a deferral representing 16 per cent of borrowers.

Evan Siddall, President and CEO of the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), alerted that by October, the financial system might approach the debt-deferral cliff, when loan forbearance programs end and borrowers must start making payments again.

Canada’s housing future need not be so bleak as heading to a cliff. Already, federal institutions are taking steps to allow deferrals to last until December. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), a federal government agency that regulates the banking sector, advised the financial institutions that unlike the six-month deferrals granted until the end of August, those given in September will be entitled to special treatment for up to three months. The regulator will not treat the deferred loans as past-due and hence not subject lenders to stringent capital requirements.

COVID-19 has hurt the economic fortunes of renters more so than homeowners. Economic data revealed that job losses were more pronounced for part-time workers than those working full-time jobs. As the economic engine restarts, most full-time workers, who are more likely to be homeowners, are expected to be able to meet their financial obligations, including meeting housing and shelter costs. Hence, the majority of those who opted for mortgage deferral as a precaution, are expected to exit the program without going into arrears.

A fast economic recovery, therefore, can prevent mortgage markets from approaching the deferral cliff. Also, continued support from the government and lenders can help expedite the economic recovery. For instance, anticipating a slower recovery, Australian authorities announced in July that mortgage deferrals could last for up to 10 months. In the U.S., the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) announced an extension of the moratorium on some foreclosures and evictions till December of this year. 

The quasi-government housing agencies in the U.S., Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, have instructed the lenders to continue offering relief to borrowers for up to 12 months that may include forbearance and waiving late fee penalties.

In Canada, those borrowers who would need more than six months to resume making mortgage payments could still have the option to defer payments by an additional four months. Canada Guaranty Mortgage Insurance Co., one of the three mortgage-default insurers, advised in March that the six-month mortgage deferral did not “remove the existing ability to defer up to four months throughout the life of the mortgage.”

Mortgage deferrals and Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) have helped Canadian housing markets to avoid huge spikes in mortgage arrears. A recent analysis by economists at Bank of Canada and Ryerson University have shown that without mortgage deferrals, mortgage arrears would have reached an all-time high of 1.3 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2020, up from the pre-pandemic rate of 0.25 per cent. 

Mortgage deferrals and other support measures have flattened the arrears curve. If the deferrals are not extended, the economists forecast the arrears to reach 0.53 per cent in the second quarter of 2021, which will be twice the pre-pandemic rate and higher than the arrears rate during the Great Recession in 2009.

The six-month deferral deadline was set in March with considerable uncertainty about how long the recovery would take. Realizing now that the labour market recovery will take slightly longer, a prudent approach would be to try matching the expiry of deferrals and emergency benefits with the labour market recovery.

从安倍口中消失的“安倍经济学”

8月3日，日本首相安倍晋三对到访首相官邸办公室的代理干事长稻田朋美说道：“这是不可能的”。

因为稻田对安倍未将基础财政收支（primary balance）黑字化的目标年度明确写入基本方针表达了不满。

安倍2年前确定的2025年度实现黑字的计划被新冠病毒疫情打乱。为防控疫情，追加发行国债接近100万亿日元。

“现在不能进行紧缩财政。理论正确和政治选择是不同的”，安倍的考虑是不拘泥于目标。

2012年底成立的第二届安倍政权射出了金融、财政和增长战略这一“安倍经济学三支箭”。

民主党政权下的日元升值股市下跌局面得到扭转，日本市场受到了外国投资者的关注。原来的有效求人倍率仅为0.83倍，到2019年4月达到1.63倍，刷新了1974年以来的最高纪录。

凭借“安倍经济学”赢得支持后，安倍开始致力于想做的事。如果支持率下滑，就通过经济优先来重获支持，这是第一次上台时想要同时解决难题但惨遭失败的安倍总结出的政权运营“法则”。

最典型的例子就是在允许部分行使集体自卫权的安全保障相关法案方面。该法案2015年9月19日刚一通过，安倍便在9月24日的新闻发布会上抛出“希望出生率1.8”等“新安倍经济学”。目标是借重视分配的经济政策，挽回支持率。

安倍两次决定解散众院举行大选都与消费税有关。安倍提出“安倍经济学”，使推迟增税和变更用途成为争论的焦点。2016年夏季的参议院选举也通过再次延期增税而获得胜利。

这条法则为安倍带来了稳定的支持率。日本经济新闻（中文版：日经中文网）的舆论调查结果显示，安倍内阁的支持率从未跌破30％的危险线。安倍在国政选举和党总裁选举中9连胜，构筑了“安倍一强”的政治体制。

在近期支持率下滑的2020年6月以后，原本是要推动经济的时期。但法则出现了变化。

“消费税应该减税”，在6月的自民党议员联络会上，积极财政派中支持首相的西田昌司提出应减税到8％。虽然党内有人揣测“首相会不会再次以减税为争论焦点来解散众议院”，但安倍并没有采取动作的迹象。

其中有被迫应对疫情的因素，而且也无法保证能够以“安倍经济学”重新获得支持。

日本政府7月正式确认，景气复苏在2018年10月结束，目前已经进入衰退局面。已经不可能刷新战后最长记录。从日本经济财政再生相西村康稔处看到报告后，安倍只是简短回答了句“嗯，这样啊”。

安倍今年在新闻发布会上从未提及“安倍经济学”。在2016年参议院选举前的6月新闻发布会上连提了18次，2014年众议院选举前的11月连提了11次。从2018年下半年开始，提的次数逐渐减少。

2020年春季反复提起的“疫情后经济V字复苏”现在也不好再提了。受7月以后疫情再次蔓延的影响，可能已经无法实现。

熟悉日本经济、也跟安倍交换意见的哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院高级研究员保罗·谢尔德（Paul Sheard）这样说道：

“受疫情影响，日本经济再次陷入低迷，进入慢性通缩的危险性很高。此次才应该承诺通货再膨胀政策”。

安倍任期还剩下一年多，经济运营目前一片混沌。

• A 20 per cent fall in real-estate activity could lead to a 5-10 per cent fall in GDP, even without amplification from a banking crisis, paper shows
• Housing is still unlikely to be the trigger for an imminent financial crisis due to regulatory protections

China’s real estate sector may have peaked and will likely become a drag on growth during economic shocks such as the current pandemic, a recent report co-authored by Harvard University’s Kenneth Rogoff argues
The decades-long housing boom has causes both prices and supply to be misaligned and the market may have hit “a potentially precarious peak,” according to the working paper published by Rogoff and Yuan Yuanchen of Tsinghua University in Beijing.
Housing is still unlikely to be the trigger for an imminent financial crisis due to regulatory protections like high down payments, they wrote.
Both the household income and demographic growth that supported the boom have slowed recently and the downward trend is expected to continue, according to the paper, which was published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in the US.
China’s economy rebounded 3.2 per cent in the second quarter as measures to ease pandemic restrictions helped revive economic activity. Gross domestic product saw a historic slump in the first quarter following the coronavirus outbreak that was first detected in Wuhan in central Hubei province.
The nation’s banking regulator has asked its lenders to make preparations for a “big rise” in non-performing loans as part of Beijing’s efforts to brace its financial system for shocks from the coronavirus at home and a hostile environment abroad.
China’s over-reliance on the sector and its strong links to other industries such as furnishings and leasing services mean the effect of a drop in housing activity could be amplified across the economy. Real estate and its related industries contributed roughly 29 per cent of China’s gross domestic product, the authors estimate.
“We find that a 20 per cent fall in real-estate activity could lead to a 5-10 per cent fall in GDP, even without amplification from a banking crisis, or accounting for the importance of real estate as collateral,” they said.
Despite the Chinese authorities’ capacity to intervene and regulate the market, the current situations “will make finding a soft-landing challenging” and “even modestly declining prices, compared to the usual pattern of ever rising prices, could pose a considerable risk.